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ABSTRACT 
 
This research paper concentrates on evaluating the long-term post-merger performance 
of Finnish mergers and acquisitions completed during 1995–2006. As the overall wealth 
effects related to acquisitions are enormous, their performance and success has been 
immensely studied both by researchers and corporate managers. This research though 
has mainly concentrated on observing the announcement period returns while the long-
term studies have been scarce. The purpose of this study is to test how and if the pre-
merger valuation of the acquirer influences the eventual three-year post-merger 
performance. 
 
Using an event study method, the aim is to find out if high-valuation “glamour” firms 
are the primary cause of the long-term performance. The effects of the chosen payment 
method and acquirer size are also studied in order to offer a more comprehensive view 
of the factors affecting the mergers and acquisitions. Attention is also given for recent 
findings of the short comings of long-term event-studies and especially the problems 
which might present themselves. These findings imply that measuring problems 
associated to the use of the conventional t-test for long-term event-studies might have 
been a source of the negative underperformance of some of the earlier studies. 
 
The results clearly show that Finnish acquirers which undertake mergers and 
acquisitions perform poorly afterwards, but a majority of the poor performance can be 
accounted for high-valuation “glamour” acquirers. Low-valuation “value” firms also 
underperform but no statistical significance is found. The evidence also suggests that 
the chosen method of payment affects the long-term performance as acquisitions 
financed using equity only fared considerably worse than those financed with cash only. 
The acquirer size had also effect on the eventual performance of the merger. All size 
groups underperformed but statistical significance was only found for medium and 
small acquirers.  
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: mergers and acquisitions, pre-merger valuation, long-term performance 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Every year billions change hands when corporations complete mergers or takeovers. 
The ongoing integration and the rapid development of worldwide capital markets have 
given companies access to new markets and growth opportunities. This has also affected 
the merger markets in a way that the number of mergers and their overall value has 
constantly increased. When corporate executives decide to acquire smaller competitors 
or struggling rivals, they are making decisions which might affect thousands of 
employees, customers and owners around the world. This is why mergers, their 
performance and overall results have been studied extensively by researchers and 
corporate management themselves. The aim has been to discover specific factors or 
determinants which could help to explain why certain mergers succee and others fail 
completely. 
 
In Finland, the deep recession in the turn of 1980s and 1990s forced companies to 
restruct or sell their unprofitable businesses. Large companies in metal, forest, banking 
and technology sectors were unable to continue as large conglomerates, and had to 
streamline their operations just to survive. As Ali-Yrkkö (2002: 1) mentions, this started 
a decade long merger wave in Finland. Kallunki, Peltoniemi and Pyykkö (2009) state 
that especially the deregulation of capital markets which allowed foreign investors to 
buy  and hold the stocks of Finnish companies boosted the development and the 
liquidity of the markets and meant that the Helsinki stock exchange became one of the 
most international stock markets in the world. Similarly the increased liquidity and 
therefore a more efficient flow of resources gave Finnish companies an opportunity to 
expand their own businesses. Rising stock market during the 1990s had also a positive 
influence on the mergers and acquisition (later M&A) market. Evidenced by Ali-Yrkkö 
(2002 especially Figure 4.2) who shows that, when the size of the economy is taken into 
consideration, Finland was the most active EU member state during the 1990´s in the 
M&A business. 
 
Pike and Neale (2006: 545) point out the total value of worldwide M&A markets 
dropped to 1,75$ trillion dollars in 2001, from 3,5$ trillion in 2000. More recently, after 
the economy started to recover from the tech bubble, companies were again eager to 
undertake new M&A. According to a M&A outlook (2007), the worldwide M&A 
activity was a staggering 4,06$ trillion in 2006. The report predicts that the M&A 
activity will continue to rise in 2007 and 2008, but because of the cyclical nature of the 
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M&A markets, a sharp decline in the world economic growth or a financial crises would 
seriously affect the M&A markets in a similar fashion as in 2001.  
 
In Finland, several large mergers valued over a billion € have been completed after the 
turn of the millennium, the most notable mergers happening in the energy, forest and 
finance sectors. Currently as the world economy is recovering from the financial crisis, 
low interest rates, increased liquidity and conservative firm valuations could be seen as 
positive signs when anticipating an increase in the future merger activity.  
 
Because of the enormous wealth effects associated to the M&A, firm and manager 
specific characteristics affecting the overall merger outcome have been studied 
immensely. These merger motives have been usually associated to synergy gains where 
two merging companies should function more efficiently compared to operating 
individually. Similarly the merger performance has attracted several researchers to 
study and evaluate the market reactions and overall outcomes of mergers.  
 
While the short-term wealth gains for target owners have been observed in numerous 
studies time and time again, the returns and benefits for bidders and more precisely their 
long-run returns are still a bit of a mystery. Depending on the research period and the 
studied market, results from the long-term performance of bidders have been 
conflicting, and lately, the development of the estimation methods especially regarding 
stock returns have shown that long-term tests are vulnerable to serious biases depending 
on the chosen methodological approach, thus creating a new problem for measuring the 
overall M&A outcome.    
 
 
1.1. Research problem and approach 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study the long-term stock performance of Finnish 
companies undertaking acquisitions. This is done by evaluating the three year period 
after the original deal announcement, in order to discover how the acquirers` pre-merger 
valuation affects the long-term stock performance. This paper also studies how the 
chosen payment method and the acquirers` size affect the eventual outcome of the 
merger. The motivation for the study has two main reasons. 
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First, as the majority of research papers concentrates on the immediate stock market 
reaction of both the bidders and targets share prices, studies focusing on the long-term 
performance of these acquisitions have been rather scarce. The announcement period 
returns have been studied using Finnish data also, but the long-term performance has 
been somewhat neglected, so this paper aims to offer more information about the long-
term performance of Finnish acquisitions compared to other countries and provide 
knowledge if similar return patterns exists also in Finland. 
 
Secondly, several influential research papers have documented the effect of company 
valuation to its future stock returns, an area that until quite recently hasn`t been studied 
in relation to M&A. While research papers studying this valuation effect has been 
published concerning other nations, Finland hasn`t been part of these countries. So this 
paper looks to fulfil this gap in research, and evaluates how bidder valuation affects the 
long-term results of M&A in Finland. 
 
 
1.2. Research hypothesis 
 
Studies have shown that pre-merger valuation affects how well or badly the acquirer 
performs after the announced merger. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003) measure the pre-merger valuation using company P/E and B/M ratios as 
proxies. They show that in the US and in the UK respectively, value companies (low 
valuation) outperform glamour companies (high valuation) on the following long-term 
period after the merger. More precisely, the weak after-merger performance of the 
glamour acquirers seems to be the primary source of the previously widely observed 
and reported long-term underperformance.  
 
The same studies also show that the method chosen to pay for the acquisition affects the 
long-term performance of the undertaken M&A. Rau and Vermaelen and Sudarsanam 
and Mahate report that cash bidders outperform equity bidders. The effects of acquirer 
size is tested because of findings by Fama and French (1992,1993) and Bauman, 
Conover and Miller (1998) whom report that size is an important factor explaining the 
variation of stock returns and that there is a significant performance difference between 
glamour and value firms. So, this paper aims to study if pre-merger valuation, method 
of payment and acquirer size affects the long-term performance of Finnish acquirers, 
and therefore the hypotheses for this study are: 
10 
 
H1: Low P/E acquirers (value acquirers) outperform high P/E acquirers (glamour 
acquirers) 
 
H2: Low ME/BE acquirers (value acquirers) outperform high ME/BE acquirers 
(glamour acquirers) 
 
H3: Bidders using cash as a method of payment will outperform bidders using equity as 
a method of payment 
 
H4: Value acquirers will outperform similar sized glamour acquirers 
 
 
1.3. The organization of the research paper  
 
This research paper examines the long-term post merger stock performance of the 
acquiring companies in Finland and how their pre-merger valuation affects the success 
of the completed M&A. To sufficiently cover the area of long-term performance the rest 
of the paper is organised in the following way. Chapter 1 offers insight on the economic 
importance of M&A, and also the motivation, research problem and the testable 
hypotheses for this research paper. Chapter 2 includes definitions associated with M&A, 
explains different merger types and reviews the most important motives for M&A. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to the previous studies conducted about the long-term performance 
of M&A while Chapter 4 explains the most common approaches available when 
conducting long-term post-merger performance studies, and also reviews recent 
developments and findings that could cause difficulties within these studies. Chapter 5 
presents the data selection and explains the used research methods and the theoretical 
background of the hypotheses, followed by Chapter 6 which reports the results of the 
study and finally Chapter 7 includes the conclusions drawn from this research paper and 
recommendations for future study. 
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2. MERGERS & ACQUISITION THEORY 
 
In this paper all reported acquisitions are considered to be similar with oneanother, but 
in reality there are differences with the types of M&A. As Pike and Neale (2006: 542–
543) clarify, a merger happens when two companies combine their interests and form a 
new company. This action has to be accepted by shareholders of both companies. A 
takeover in the other hand is an acquisition by a single company offering cash, shares or 
some combination of these, to acquire the share capital of another company. If a 
takeover is completed, the acquiring company absorbs the target but in this case, no new 
entity is created. Halpern (1983) states that tender offers are offers to purchase a 
proportion of available stock on specific terms or dates while Loughran and Vijh (1997) 
further explain that tender offers are usually made directly to target shareholders. By 
doing this, acquirers try to avoid the possible resistance of incapable managers and are 
looking for greater efficiency gains.  
 
Especially when public companies propose and undertake M&A decisions, Bean (1975: 
1) explains that they are immediately carefully processed by market participants. 
Details, like costs and future profits, are extremely interesting for lenders and buyers 
and could drastically affect the future of the acquiring company. Also, companies may 
have some sources of value e.g. labour skills or technical excellence which isn`t directly 
reflected in companies balance statements and thus in their stock price, but could be 
very valuable (Bean 1975: 2). A good example of this was the hostile takeover of Partek 
by Kone in 2002. Partek that had previously been active in the acquisitions market was 
a target of Kone but also KCI Konecranes. Kone ultimately won the bidding contest, 
and shortly after the acquisition, Kone sold several parts of old Partek while re-
acclaiming a substantial share of the original price paid or was suggested by Partek`s 
stock value that time.  
 
 
2.1. Merger Waves  
 
It`s been well documented that M&A cluster and appear in waves. So far five merger 
waves have been documented and studied by financial researchers: in early 1900s, the 
1920s, the 1960s, the 1980s and the 1990s. The last one being particularly important 
because of it`s size and geographical dispersion. Previously focused in the US markets, 
the last merger wave included an emergence of European and UK companies 
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participating in the M&A. The overall M&A activity in the euro area increased sharply 
after 1997 and reached an all time high in 2000, when transactions involving EU 
companies were almost 2000€ billion. (Martynova and Renneboog 2008; Campa and 
Hernando 2006.)  
 
Economic booms are usually behind the increased merger activity as conditions in the 
financial markets are pleasant for undertaking acquisitions. Takeovers coincide with 
times of rapid credit expansion, high stock market valuation and changes in legislation 
or deregulation of markets. Similarly, M&A markets tend to slow down quickly after 
stock market declines or during times of recession. The first merger wave in the 
beginning of the 1900s can be attributed for large intra industry mergers, triggered by 
technology and industrial innovations. Second (1920s) for the creation of several 
oligopolies, third (1960s) was the wave of conglomerates as companies were looking to 
reduce their cyclical risks and therefore acquired unrelated companies or new 
businesses. The wave of 1980s started when stock markets recovered from their 
previous decline, and simultaneously several changes in the regulation of financial 
markets were introduced. Finally the last merger wave (1990s) can be seen as a first 
global merger wave, as for the first time, companies from Europe and Asia also 
participated in several billion dollar M&A. (Martynova and Renneboog 2008; Ali-
Yrkkö 2002.) 
 
While previous research has shown that M&A appear in waves, they also seem to 
cluster sector-wise. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) evidenced that intra industry shocks 
are important factors for the increases in merger activity on a specific sector. They list 
e.g deregulation, innovations in financing technology and input cost changes as sources 
for these shocks, and to counter these shocks on a sector level, corporate takeovers are 
an economical way to react to them. Mitchell and Mulherin studied the 1980s merger 
wave in the US and report that there appeared to be substantial sector variation in the 
number of undertaken mergers and to which sectors they concentrated. Although all 
industries experienced takeovers during the 1980s, the highest number of M&A activity 
was completed in industries experiencing the greatest fundamental shocks. Andrade and 
Stafford (2004) show that in their research, half of observed intra industry mergers 
clustered to a five-year span and resulted from industry shocks.  
 
Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) state that in a case of e.g. an intra industry technological 
shock that creates an expansion in firm sizes, can be countered internally or externally 
in that sector. Companies could achieve the size growth through an outside takeover or 
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an inside expansion. Andrade and Stafford (2004) add that firms might try to increase 
their size and scale in order to afford major capital investments. Intra industry mergers 
could also be caused by corporate restructuring i.e. rationalization of operations or 
excluding of overlapping functions. Halford (2005) agrees with Mitchell and Mulherin 
and Andrade and Stafford with their findings but adds that a sufficient increase in 
capital liquidity i.e. low transaction costs and economic motivation is imperative for 
industry shocks to become merger waves.  
 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) find that increases in average sector 
valuation error, increase the merger activity on that specific industry compared to other 
sectors. They also report that while sector-level miss valuation is a crucial component of 
merger waves, it explains only 15% of them. On a firm-level, miss-valuation is integral 
of explaining who participates in merger waves. Harford (2005) finds a somewhat 
differing result, he reports that intra industry market-to-book ratio has some predictive 
power of merger waves but when including additional economic values to the model it 
becomes insignificant. Harford also reports of some evidence of bidder 
underperformance after a merger wave. 
 
 
2.2. Different types of acquisitions 
 
Pike and Neale (2006: 549) list three different types of acquisitions: 
 
Horizontal integration – an acquisition where a company acquires inside the same 
industry and the target company is at the same stage of the production process. Fee and 
Thomas (2004) studied horizontal acquisitions and report that the main reason why 
managers undertake such acquisitions is the expectation of higher productive efficiency. 
Fee and Thomas note that horizontal acquisitions gives also more buying power to the 
merged entity, thus decreasing supplier cash flows and ultimately their profits, 
especially on  more concentrated sectors. Andrade and Stafford (2004) show that on an 
industry-level, excessive product capacity increases the likelihood of mergers while 
peak product capacity leads to increased internal investments by firms. Capron (1999) 
studies the long-term performance of European and US manufacturing companies 
conducting horizontal acquisitions. He reports that cost savings, market coverage and 
innovation capabilities as the main reasons affecting their post-merger performance. 
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Vertical integration – is similar to horizontal integration but the target company 
operates on a different stage of the production process. Fan and Goyal (2006) state that 
vertical mergers give acquiring companies more control of the production processes. 
They also report that between 1962 and 1996, one-third of the US sample mergers 
where vertical by nature and that the number of completed vertical mergers was on the 
rise regardless of what sector they were undertaken.  
 
Conglomerate or unrelated diversification – the target corporation may operate in an 
entirely different sector, but they may share some activities e.g marketing or 
administration. Capron (1999) mentions that sharing activities enables merging 
businesses to achieve cost reduction based on learning curve economics. Without the 
merger, the businesses alone might not have the necessary cumulative production 
volume to fully take advantage of them.  Fan and Goyal (2006) report that in the US, 
conglomerate mergers peaked during the 1960s and later they became more focus 
related i.e were more industry specific. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that the 
conglomerates wave was triggered by owners of high-valuation bidders trying to claim 
a substantial share of long-term capital.  
 
Ross, Westerfield and Jordan (2006: 801) offer examples of other types of mergers. 
They explain that a proxy contest occurs when a group tries to obtain enough votes (by 
using proxies i.e. a right to vote with someone else’s rights) to get a controlling seats in 
the corporate board of directors. The aim is to change the current directors. Company 
directors and outside investors may choose to conduct a leveraged buyout (LBO), i.e. 
buying all the available equity. A LBO purchase is usually heavily leveraged, hence the 
name.  
 
Ross et al. also report that companies don`t necessarily need to conduct mergers while 
increasing their level of co-operation. A strategic alliance might be formed in an effort 
to create e.g. new products or pursuit some other joint goal. Also a joint venture could 
be formed, where two or more firms invest money to create a new firm which to 
operate. Pike and Neale (2006: 549) conclude that in reality acquisitions are rarely so 
easily classified because of the complexity associated to them. 
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2.3. Motives for M & A 
 
Shareholder wealth maximization is considered in the finance literature as the number 
one priority for company management. They should continuously search and exploit 
new opportunities, when trying to improve their company value. Bean (1975: 2) adds 
that even when the economy isn`t doing well, this shouldn`t stop firms from looking for 
new investment opportunities, but instead requiring them to make better capital 
investment decisions with more limited resources. Halpern (1983: 299) adds that for the 
acquirers there should be an expectation of a positive economic gain and thus the 
acquiring firm should earn at least a normal rate of return.  
 
The finance literature in general states that companies undertake acquisitions because 
they are trying to generate more profits or act more efficiently as a new entity, 
compared to separate companies. Andrade and Stafford (2004) add that one must 
evaluate the pros and cons of the choice to merge or invest internally, as they both are 
ways to increase firm`s assets and productive base. This so called value-additivity is an 
important reason behind corporate acquisitions and is usually illustrated as: 
 
 Va+b > Va + Vb 
 
where, entities a and b together are worth more than a and b separately. 
The aforementioned description is called the neoclassical theory of mergers where 
managers act to maximize shareholder wealth, i.e. assets are redeployed to a more 
efficient use. In contrast, if increased merger activity is attributed to periods of financial 
market miss valuations or managers having information not available to other market 
participants, this could signal that overvaluation influences merger activity. Some 
believe that the staggering equity price drops following recent merger waves support 
this view. (Rhodes-Kropf et. al 2005; Rosen 2006.) 
 
2.3.1. Synergy 
 
Synergy is constantly mentioned as the main reason why managers decide to undertake 
corporate mergers. The financial literature features numerous studies concerning the 
synergy effects that may or may not be achieved by a merger. Synergy benefits are 
thought to be obtainable when two separate entities merge, forming a new corporation 
which is more valuable than two separate companies (usually presented as 2+2=5). Pike 
and Neale (2006: 549) clarify that synergy gains are not related to economics of scale 
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and might emerge from some specific way of utilizing combined resources. Ross et al. 
(2006: 806) state that an important factor for an acquisition is the thought that the new 
firm would generate higher revenues, which could be created by marketing gains, 
strategic benefits or an increase in market power. 
 
There`s three different synergy effects distinguished: financial, operational and 
managerial. Financial synergies result as a lower cost of capital, what could happen by 
investing to unrelated business or increasing the company size. They can also be 
attainable if a company creates an internal capital market, where operating using 
superior information could lead to more efficient allocation of capital. Operating 
synergies can rise from combining separate units or from knowledge transfer. Both 
could lead to lesser costs of business units, but must be weighted against the cost of 
acquiring the assets or units. Managerial synergies depend on the superiority of 
acquirers planning and supervisory abilities, which are beneficial for the target 
company. (Trautwein 1990.)  
 
A study by Devos, Kadapakkam and Krishnamurthy (2008) concentrated on measuring 
the eventual effect that synergies create. They find that in a sample of 264 large mergers 
during 1980 – 2004, the measured average synergy gain is 10,03% of the total value of 
the newly combined entities. They further decompose the results and show that 
operating synergies consist for 8,38% of observed gain and the rest comes from tax 
savings. Devos et al. also find supporting evidence for e.g. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 
study that value acquirers undertake better mergers compared to glamour acquirers.  
 
2.3.2. Managerial motives 
 
This section reviews studies concentrating on different managerial motives related to 
M&A. Some overlapping does exists concerning these theories. The agency theory (see 
Jensen and Meckling 1976) argues that corporate managers and their own interests may 
be vastly different from the views and interests of corporate owners or shareholders, 
thus creating an agency problem. Managers might be inclined to e.g. expand the 
company beyond its sustainable or rational level, or they might try to obtain more 
profitable positions from other companies when undertaking mergers. Rosen (2006) 
notes that many of the defensive mergers during 1990s where caused by managers 
protecting their own interests.  
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The free cash flow (FCF) that companies are able to accumulate is available money that 
could be e.g. paid to owners. Jensen (1988) mentions that if the FCF that a company 
produces is substantial, the possibility of irrational actions, i.e. investing at projects at a 
lower than the cost of capital rate, by corporate managers could even severe the conflict 
of interests of the two parties. Jensen also concludes that it`s somewhat paradoxical that 
a higher amount of available resources could lead to more in-efficiencies and thus result 
as a lower company value.  
 
Draper and Paudyal (2008) investigate if information asymmetry between corporate 
managers and financial markets is a source for M&A. They hypothesize that 
undervalued companies might undertake M&A in order to increase the attention of 
market participants, and to make them to re-evaluate them, in a view to increase their 
stock price and valuation. Managers of undervalued companies could be inclined to use 
such a method in order to fight possible takeovers and at the same time project their 
own benefits. Draper and Paudyal find supporting evidence from the UK mergers for 
their hypothesis, i.e. when there is higher information asymmetry between managers 
and outside investors this leads to higher announcement period returns. The result is 
even more apparent for infrequent bidders than to multiple bidders. 
 
2.3.3. Economies of scale 
 
Walker (2000) gives various reasons which could manifest as economies of scale. 
Companies could expand geographically to new markets, they could broaden their 
product line by acquiring a rival whose successful at some another product sector, 
increase their market share or choose to diversify. Pike and Neale (2006: 549) add that 
larger size should create economies of scale in manufacturing, marketing or give the 
corporation a chance to negotiate better terms with their capital markets associates. Ross 
et al. (2006: 807) give an example of Cingulars acquisition of AT&T Wireless, where 
although the combined firm was much larger after the acquisition, the company saved a 
lot of money streamlining its operations, and as a result the operating and capital cost 
per customer was much lower. 
 
Lambrecht (2004) offers additional information of acquisitions that happen because of 
economies of scale. He provides evidence that there exists a positive correlation 
between merger gains from economies of scale and product market demand. These 
acquisitions are more likely to appear during rising product markets. Lambrecht also 
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shows that friendly mergers tend to happen at the beginning of a merger wave and 
speculates that hostile acquisitions should take place later on, because of the time 
needed for the merger approval and restructuring.  
 
2.3.4. Hubris 
 
One of the major hypotheses for merger activity is the Hubris hypothesis presented by 
Roll (1986). This theory suggests that acquiring firm managers when making takeover 
decisions overestimate the possible gains from successful acquisitions and thus pay 
more of their targets on average. Even if there really is a chance for the entities to 
achieve financial gains, Roll argues that the takeover premium for the target 
shareholders includes a valuation error and hubris. Roll also concludes that the 
existence of hubris means that corporate management doesn`t always act with the best 
interests of the shareholders in their mind. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) go as far 
as claiming that “…managers will overpay for targets with high private benefits. p.32”  
Rosen (2006) speculates that if managers are rewarded for short-term performance they 
might undertake bad acquisitions in order to improve the stock price, which in turn 
could explain the positive announcement period returns and also the long-run reversal.  
 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) conduct a study were they test synergy- and agency 
motives as well as the hubris simultaneously, in order to measure the correlation 
between the target and total gains. They hypothesize that the correlation should be 
positive for mergers conducted because of synergy, negative if done for management 
(agency) reasons, and zero if hubris is the motive. The results suggest that synergy is the 
main reason (positive correlation between target and total gains) but there is 
considerable differences between the studied subsamples, were the agency theory is the 
dominating motive, and the likely cause of value-reducing acquisitions instead of 
hubris. 
  
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) also study the CEO Hubris and the effects it has on 
corporate takeovers. They find evidence of four different factors which are attributable 
for CEO hubris. They identify acquiring company`s recent performance, recent media 
exposure of the CEO, a measure for CEO`s self-importance and a composite factor of 
the previous as sources for CEO hubris. Their study provides evidence that a higher 
level of CEO hubris leads to higher bid premiums and finally results as lower long-term 
returns. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stultz (2004) find supporting evidence for this, 
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reporting that the paid acquisition premiums grow as the size of the acquirer increases 
leading them to sum that the hubris effect is more of a problem for large firms than 
small.  
 
2.3.5. Stock market driven acquisitions 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) introduced a new theory of acquisitions where they are 
driven by stock markets and their miss valuations. They argue that markets aren`t 
completely efficient, so companies might be miss valued, but also that company 
managers are completely rational and are able to use this knowledge for their own 
benefit when making merger decisions. Companies would have an incentive to use their 
own overvalued stock as they purchase new corporations. Like Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) study, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) present a behavioral explanation 
for stock market related acquisitions. Their model assumes that managers from both 
companies (acquirer and target), have private information about their own company and 
also are aware that the observed company value is incorrect. Target company 
management is forced to make a decision to accept or reject the offer with incomplete 
knowledge of the true value of the acquirer. Still, they know that the acquirer (using 
stock as method of payment) is overvalued (because they are too) and therefore are able 
to adjust the incorrect valuation, and hence, on average they`re able to make the right 
decision about the acceptance of the acquisition offer.   
 
Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) tested the aforementioned theories and their empirical 
implications, more precisely if there is a link between merger waves and miss valuation. 
Rhodes-Kropf et al. use the Market-to-Book measure (they decompose it to firm and 
sector level component and also to a component that measures firms long-run growth 
opportunities) to test if and when companies choose to undertake mergers or become 
targets of such. They find that acquirers and targets cluster on high time-series sector 
errors, meaning that they both have a similar miss valuation component. On a sector 
level, the time-series error also seems to increase the equity financed merger activity. 
They also note the acquirer valuations are usually significantly higher than their targets, 
and finally that the observed miss valuation explains roughly 15% of the sector level 
merger activity acting as important factor explaining the merger activity along with e.g. 
sector productivity shocks.  
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Rhodes-Kropf et al. also report that when controlling for the firm-specific and time-
series sector errors, they find that low long-run value-to-book companies surprisingly 
buy the high long-run value-to-book targets. An unusual finding regarding the merger 
activity, the researchers speculate that it could be caused by managers buying targets 
with a higher long-run valuation or perhaps by incompetent managers who might be 
acquiring companies with more skilled managers, and then trying to adapt their own 
organization to learn from them.  
 
2.3.6. Other reasons for mergers and acquisitions. 
 
There exists also wide array of other motives that academics have been able to discover 
and study. Jensen and Ruback (1983: 24) mention tax reasons as a stimulant for M&A, 
although Devos et al (2008) report that tax considerations aren`t as important source for 
M&A as previously thought. Jensen (1988) mentions that corporate managers have an 
incentive to create new debt as a substitute for dividends, and this way are able to 
reduce the available FCF. Morck et al. (1990) find evidence that managerial motives 
cause managers to buy growth and to diversify, in order to gain more personal benefits. 
Rosen (2006) offers merger momentum as source for increased merger activity. He finds 
evidence that if the markets have reacted favourably to previous merger 
announcements; it will continue to perceive them more positively. Petmezas (2009) 
arrives to the same conclusion when studying UK mergers. He finds evidence that 
managers rushed merger decisions during the hot merger period, but the lack of proper 
evaluation about the merger had a negative impact on the post-merger returns. Pike and 
Neale (2006: 550) include market power acquisitions, risk reduction and stock market 
listing also as possible reasons for M&A.  
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3. PREVIOUS RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
Because the purpose of the thesis is to concentrate solely on the long-term performance 
of mergers, I don`t review research papers which have studied the immediate 
(announcement period) returns for acquiring and target companies. Jensen and Ruback 
(1983), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Agrawal and Jaffe (1999) sum that researchers have 
found that during the announcement period target company owners earn significant 
returns from all acquisitions, and that acquiring companies earn little or no abnormal 
returns for tender offers and negative abnormal returns from mergers.  
 
The majority of the research concerning the long-term return of mergers have studied 
the US and UK markets. For this reason Dutta and Jog (2009) claim that some studies 
suffer from overlapping US data and data mining. As the number of previous US studies 
is high compared to other countries, US studies are reviewed separately from other 
countries. 
 
 
3.1. Results from long-term studies in US 
 
One of earliest studies that study the long-term performance of takeovers was conducted 
by Asquith (1983). He studies the merger process as whole, and argue that previous 
studies neglecting to do so, miss some of the returns associated with mergers. The idea 
was to study the pre-merger period to observe can markets anticipate the coming merger 
and also to study the stock returns after the merger announcement. The research sample 
included successful and unsuccessful mergers from a time period of 1962 to 1976, and 
Asquith uses an estimation period starting 480 trading days before the merger 
announcement and ending 240 days after. The results show that as predicted by efficient 
markets, market participants were able to anticipate the upcoming mergers and suggest 
that previous studies were unable to measure the total returns of the merger process 
correctly. They also show that after 240 trading days bidder firms had a statistically 
negative returns of 7.2 percent, a result that remained puzzling. 
 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) review thoroughly the existing literature concerning 
corporate takeovers. They mention that previous results suggest that on average bidding 
firms announcement period returns are approximately zero, i.e. no abnormal returns. 
The authors note that bidding firm returns are harder to estimate, and because stock 
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prices reflect expectations, a merger news shouldn`t change the observed price. Like 
Asquith (1983), Jensen and Ruback wonder why bidders stock price fall one year 
following the merger, concluding that this is against the market efficiency and suggest 
overestimation of merger gains as a reason behind this.   
 
An important study by Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) who concentrate solely on the 
post-takeover issue, offers a comprehensive view on different testing methods and 
several factors that could affect the long-term performance of corporate acquisitions. 
Agrawal and Jaffe (1999) use the Franks et al. (1991) research paper as a divider in the 
research done on the M&A field, and give them credit for their valuable work in the 
post-takeover issue. 
 
Franks et al. study examines 399 acquisitions from 1975 to 1984 and they e.g. form 
comparable eight –and ten-factor portfolio benchmarks to measure the long-term 
performance of the acquirers, while trying to avoid the known biases with the traditional 
benchmarks. They find contrasting evidence about the long-term performance of the 
acquirers depending on the used benchmark. When comparing single-factor benchmarks 
to multi-factor benchmarks, it appeared that the multi-factor models showed statistically 
insignificant post-merger performance while the observed results for single-factor 
benchmarks where the opposite. This lead Franks et al. to conclude that previous studies 
findings were due to benchmarking errors. 
 
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) study US mergers from 1955 to 1987 in NYSE 
and AMEX stock exchanges. Their sample includes 937 mergers and 227 tender offers 
and they use two different kinds of research methods to evaluate the long-term returns 
and factors affecting them. Agrawal et al. take into account the firm size and company 
beta and test how they affect the merger outcome. They report a robust statistically 
significant negative return of about 10% for the following five–year post-merger return 
using several different methods. But they don`t find evidence that a change in the beta 
factor causes the result. Fama and French (1993) comment that the negative results 
could be a result of the book-to-market effect. Agrawal et.al also repeat the Franks et.al 
(1991) study and report that their findings are specific only for the research period and 
the results are influenced by the fact, that they include mergers and tender offers in the 
same sample.  
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Loughran and Vijh (1997) study US mergers for a period of 1970–1989 from NYSE 
and AMEX stock exchanges. Their research method differs from Franks et al. (1991) 
and Agrawal et.al (1992) as they measure the five-year abnormal returns using matching 
stocks to control for size and book-to-market effect. They report that the post merger 
abnormal returns depend on the type of the acquisition (merger or tender offer) and the 
method of payment (cash or stock). The reported abnormal returns vary from 
significantly negative -25 % to significantly positive 61,7 % depending on the 
aforementioned factors. Loughran and Vijh state that the observed large abnormal post 
acquisition results are against the market efficiency.    
 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) conduct an interesting study about the long-term 
performance of US mergers. They take into account the bidder size and book-to-market 
factors and study separately mergers and tender offers. The authors also separate, on 
basis of their book-to-market valuation, high “glamour” and low “value” bidders from 
each other. Their study includes 3169 mergers and 348 tender offers from 1980 to 1991. 
When adjusting for size and book-to-market ratios, bidders (mergers) underperform 
their equally weighted control portfolios, but for tender offers the results show that they 
earn a statistically significant abnormal return of 9%. When comparing the value and 
glamour bidders, Rau and Vermaelen report that value bidders earn significantly higher 
abnormal returns than glamour bidders and also that the result is unchanged even when 
events are excluded. This leads the authors to comment that glamour bidders make 
poorer acquisition decisions altogether.   
 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) study mergers, seasoned equity offerings (SEO) and share 
repurchases from 1958 – 1993. They also discuss in detail the recent developments 
concerning the long-term event study tests and concentrate especially on the Buy-and-
hold abnormal return (later BHAR) method as it has been the most common method 
when studying the overall effects of corporate mergers. They use a three-year period for 
the long-term testing and measure the overall effects using the BHAR method. Their 
results show that the BHAR method has statistical limitations, and when these are 
accounted for, Mitchell and Stafford are unable to find evidence of any abnormal 
returns contrary to many other studies. 
 
Rosen (2006) studies how and if merger momentum and investor sentiment influence 
the long-run returns for acquiring companies. Rosen studies how mergers undertaken 
during a “hot merger” market compare to those that are announced some time else. The 
study sample includes US mergers from 1992 to 2001 and Rosen uses the BHAR 
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method but also investigates long-run results using a portfolio approach. The results 
show that mergers announced during hot merger markets suffer from long-run reversal, 
and that their announcement period returns are higher compared to mergers which are 
announced outside of “hot merger periods”. Rosen explains that investors react 
positively to merger announcements but revise their expectations later on.   
 
An exhaustive research paper by Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2008) reviews the 
research done in different phases of the acquisition process. As a part of their review 
paper they conduct a long-term testing for a sample of 15,298 completed US mergers 
during 1980–2003. They study three-year post-merger returns and also compare the 
returns to matched firms of corresponding size and B/M ratio. The results show that 
acquirers underperform significantly. The observed BHARs for acquirers using equal or 
valueweights are respectively -21,9% and 17,1%. Betton et.al also measures the long-
run returns using a modified Fama-French (1993) model and a portfolio performance 
estimation. The results are strikingly different, and show that there doesn`t appear to be 
any significant underperformance. Betton et al. state that differences between event and 
matched firms may partly cause the differencing result, but still conclude that they 
cannot reject the hypothesis that merging firms underperform.  
 
 
3.2. Results from long-term studies from other countries 
 
Gregory (1997) studies large UK mergers over a period of 1984–1992. He uses several 
benchmarks and research methods to minimize errors caused by the long research 
period. The sample consists of 452 mergers and regardless of the research method, the 
reported results show clearly that acquirers lost in the two year post merger period. The 
findings are similar to other studies conducted in the UK and Gregory also notes that 
company size or their book-to-market values don`t explain the negative post merger 
returns.  
 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) follow the Rau and Vermaelen (1998) study and test if 
there are similarities to be found using a UK sample. Sudarsanam and Mahate examine 
both short- and long-term performance of value and glamour acquirers (measured by 
P/E ratio and market-to-book value, MTBV) and also their method of payment and pre- 
and post-merger performance. The study measures BHAR returns and uses four 
different benchmark models: The mean-adjusted model, the market-adjusted model, 
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size-adjusted model and the market-to-book value adjusted model. Sudarsanam and 
Mahate find that long-term returns depending on the benchmark index differ from -
21,9% to -8,7%. When comparing high P/E acquirers to low P/E acquirers, the results 
show that BHARs for high P/E acquirers ranges from -47% to -17% but for low P/E 
acquirers only from -9% to -2%. The results are similar when comparing high MTBV 
(glamour companies) acquirers to low MTBV (value companies) acquirers. Sudarsanam 
and Mahate conclude that the results are similar to the Rau and Vermaelen (1998) study. 
 
Gregory (2005) tests the FCF hypothesis (see Jensen 1988) and how it might affect the 
long-run post-merger returns. Gregory uses UK mergers from January 1984 to 
December 1992 and a five-year post-announcement period to test the FCF hypothesis. 
Gregory measures the abnormal returns by size and book-to-market matched returns, 
and also creates specific reference portfolios for them using the methodology suggested 
by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999). The results show that acquirers earn significantly 
negative returns for the post-merger period, a finding similar as reported in Gregory 
(1997). Gregory doesn`t find evidence supporting the FCF hypothesis for UK acquirers 
and their long-term returns, although reporting weak support for the announcement 
period. And an interesting finding is though that, acquirers with high FCFs tend to beat 
acquirers with low FCFs in the post-merger period contradictive of what the FCF 
hypothesis suggests.  
 
Campa and Hernando (2006) examine the long-run returns in the European financial 
sector. They use a one year post-merger period and study acquiring and target 
companies. A small majority of their sample firms display negative returns for the post-
merger period, but there doesn`t appear to be any statistical significance. Later, the 
authors further modify their sample and divide the included mergers based on their size 
and if the merger is a domestic one or international. The results show that acquirers 
completing smaller deals had significant negative long-run returns, while acquirers 
making large deals earned positive abnormal returns of 6%.  
 
Antoniou, Arbour and Zhao (2006) conduct a long-term test using UK mergers from 
1985 to 2001, and also concentrate on the statistical methods and problems related to 
long-term testing. (detailed discussion in chapter 4.2) They adopt a similar testing 
method as Mitchell and Stafford (2000) i.e. “corrected” BHAR returns but Antoniou et 
al. include multiple bidders in their sample, a choice they consider more appropriate as 
“… multiple bids constitute a large part of merger population p.3” Antoniou et al. first 
report statistically significant underperformance using “uncorrected” BHAR returns, 
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when using the corrected BHAR returns the reported test results become less significant 
or lose their significance all together.  
 
Antoniou et al. also conduct several statistical tests concentrating on previously 
observed determinants of long-term underperformance. They test for the method of 
payment (Loughran and Vijh 1997, Rau and Vermaelen 1998), diversification, book-to-
market effect (Rau and Vermaelen 1998) and size. They report that when adjusting the 
original t-statistics, observed BHAR results seemed to disappear almost entirely and 
displayed only weak significance. Antoniou et al. conclude that all conventional t-test 
statistics are overstated when discarding the positive cross-correlation of stock returns. 
This results in over-rejection of null hypothesis i.e. no abnormal returns.  
 
Bogdanova (2007) studied in a master`s thesis the long-term performance of domestic 
and foreign acquisitions made by Finnish companies. The research period is from 1995 
to 2000, and includes 12 domestic and 21 cross-border acquisitions made by companies 
in the OMXH main list. The reported results show a statistically significant negative 
long-term BHAR return of – 33 % for the whole sample, and when further divided to 
domestic and foreign acquisitions, they are – 9 % and – 47 % respectively. Bogdanova 
mentiones that the results are similar of what has been reported in previous research 
papers about domestic and foreign acquisitions.  
 
Petmezas (2009) studies the short –and long-term performance (one to three years) of 
public and private UK acquirers between 1984 and 2003. Petmezas studies both high –
and low valuation time periods measured by the overall P/E ratio of the value-weighted 
market index and how investor sentiment affects the overall merger return, a similar 
study was conducted by Rosen (2006) using US data. Petmezas employes a calendar 
time portfolio method to avoid the problem of cross-sectional dependence of sample 
observations. Petmezas finds evidence of similar investor over optimism as reported by 
Rosen (2006) and also long-run revearsal where acquisitions announced during rising 
stock markets cause a poor bidder performance in the long-run. 
 
Dutta and Jog (2009) study the long-term performance in Canada. Their sample 
includes 1300 M&A and span from 1993 to 2003. They use both event –and calendar-
time approaches (suggested by Kothari and Warner 2006) and several benchmarks to 
test the long-term stock and operating performance. The researchers state that they are 
using an out-of-the-sample study and the most modern and precise statistical methods. 
Like in Betton et al. (2008) for US, Dutta and Jog find very conflicting results. When 
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using reference portfolios (indexes) as benchmarks, the BHAR returns are reported to 
be statistically negative at a 1 %-level, but using control firms as a benchmark, the 
results are not statistically significant anymore. Dutta and Jog report that these results 
for acquiring firms are also robust when they account for different factors. Finally they 
comment that the contrasting results to US studies which report underperformance may 
be due to regulatory or capital market differencies.  
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4. EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY 
 
The event study methodology is useful when measuring the impact that some specific 
event has on asset prices. Rationality in the market assures that asset prices will change 
accordingly when new news becomes public. It can be applied to studies with a short or 
long observation period and for observing the long-run results, like for instance M&A. 
Event studies focusing especially on measuring short-horizon effects provide additional 
information about corporate policy decisions and help to better understand them. Also, 
for short-period studies the results are thought to be more reliable compared to long-
horizon studies. (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 1997: 149; Kothari and Warner 2006.) 
 
The event study method has its roots in the 1930`s, but seminal studies were done in 
1960`s (see Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969)). Ball and 
Brown studied the information content of earnings, whereas Fama et al. studied the 
effects of stock splits. The event study method quickly established itself, and ever since 
has been used extensively for measuring several different corporate events e.g corporate 
mergers and their effects. 
 
The existence of efficient capital markets creates problems when trying to evaluate and 
interpret results of residual analyses i.e event study approach. An announcement of a 
merger or tender offer provides considerable amount of information regarding e.g the 
event itself, the identity of the acquirer or the method of payment. Even the information 
about the acquisition could allready be incorporated in the security prices because of 
information leaks or insider trading. The separation and evaluation of the reasoning 
behind the merger announcements may therefore be difficult. (Halpern 1983: 298.) 
 
 
4.1. Models for estimating abnormal returns 
 
Several models have been developed for the testing of abnormal returns. The most 
commonly used are, the Constant-Mean-Return-Model (CMRT) or the market model. 
Brown and Warner (1985) find that despite the simple nature of the mean-return-model 
it yields similar results to those of more complex design. Campbell et al. (1997:154) 
explain that this is attributable to the fact that the variance of the abnormal return isn`t 
reduced much by choosing more sophisticated methods 
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Fama (1998) explains that the market model is, used outside of the event window to 
estimate the stock`s expected returns conditional on market returns for the specific event 
period. And because these estimations are done without constraining the cross-section 
of expected returns, thus can be used to study firm-specific events e.g mergers. 
Campbell et al. (1997) recommend the market model over the CMRT, because the 
market model can reduce the variance of the abnormal return and therefore yield better 
results. 
 
The market model is usually defined as: 
 
(1)       	  
                       
 
where Rit and Rmt are period-t returns for security i and the market portfolio respectively. 
εit is the error term and αi and βi are parameters of the market model. When rearranged, 
abnormal returns can be calculated: 
 
(2)             	  
 
Where ARit is the observed abnormal return for stock i on day t. 
 
Brown and Warner (1985: 4–5) report some problems associated to the use of daily data 
in event studies. They summarize them as non-normality, non-synchronous trading and 
market model parameter estimation, and variance estimation. Kothari and Warner 
(2006) mention, that the use of daily data is preferred because it provides more accurate 
measurements of abnormal returns and thus more informative studies. 
 
Extensive testing has also been done on a couple of other well known models, like, the 
Capital Asset Prising Model (CAPM), the Arbitrage prising model (APT), and with 
several multifactor models e.g. the Fama-French (1993) three factor model. The Fama-
French model in particular has been used on several research papers studying the long-
term performance of M&A. 
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Fama-French three factor-model is defined as: 
 
(3)                
                                          
 
where,  R(t)–RF(t) is the portfolios excess return, [RM(t) – RF(t)] is the excess market 
return, SMB(t) is the excess return of small – big firms (market capitalization), HML(t) is 
the excess return of high-book-to market – low-book-to market firms and ε(t) is the error 
term. β1,β2 and β3 are estimated from the regression. 
 
Also an important factor affecting the estimation and testing is the choice of the 
benchmark index. Dimson and Marsh (1986) report when using capitalisation weighted 
indexes, they can be expected to underperform equally-weighted portfolios of event 
securities in case of powerful size effect, and similarly, an equally weighted index will 
produce biased results if event securities differ greatly in size from typical companies 
included in the index. The researchers also report serious problems when using CAPM-
type models.  
 
 
4.2. Long-run event studies 
 
The long-horizon event study for specific sample of firms tests, if one-to-five year 
returns following a specific event are non-zero systematically. The basic thought behind 
this, is that markets over- or under-react after a specific event because of human 
judgements or behavioral biases. A systematic component in e.g. behavioral biases 
doesn`t cancel them out, but appear in the security prices which continuously differ 
from the underlying fundamentals. (Kothari 2001: 188; Kothari and Warner 2006.)  
 
Fama (1998) challenges the behavioral explanation arguing that the existence of 
efficient markets, presents and creates naturally over –and under-reaction by chance, 
and also that the frequency for both is about the same. Fama also adds that if long-term 
returns can`t be attributed to chance, i.e. the returns are too large, then the existence of 
over –and under-reaction is a victory for the market efficiency. Finally, Fama argues 
that studies for long-term returns usually neglect to test or offer any suitable alternative 
to market efficiency, but instead relax on market inefficiency. Instead Fama states that if 
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the market efficiency is rejected, it should be done by some better model for price 
formation, and one that can be tested by empirical tests. 
 
Compared to short-event studies, long-horizon studies require an appropriate adjustment 
for risk. While inadequate risk adjustment doesn`t affect the test results in short event 
testing (or the effect is minimal), risk adjustment is usually the main reason for 
difficulties in long-term testing. A small error in risk adjustment could be economically 
substantial also the choice of return model is a cause of errors. (Kothari and Warner 
2006.) 
 
4.2.1. Models for testing long-run performance 
 
Recent studies measuring the long-term performance of acquiring companies have used 
mainly the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (later CAR) and BHAR returns to measure 
the post-event returns. Fama (1998) explains that when measuring returns on a longer 
time period than one month, the monthly average abnormal returns can be averaged or 
summed (CAR). Kothari and Warner (2006) add that both testes provide also 
information about market efficiency, as systematically non-zero abnormal returns 
suggests inefficiency, and therefore a possibility for a trading rule. The CAR and BHAR 
methods can be presented in a following way. 
 
 
 
 
 
where, Rit is the simple return for month t for a sample firm, E(Rit) is expected return for 
the sample firm at time t, and ARit is the abnormal return in month t. When cumulated 
across (τ) periods yields CAR. 
 
The return for a buy-and-hold investment for a sample firm (BHAR) is illustrated as 
 
 
 
 
where, BHARit is the buy-and-hold abnormal return for company i over the time period 
T. 
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Rosen (2006) explains that the choice of using a portfolio approach or BHAR method 
leads to different trade-offs between type 1 or type 2 errors. The use of BHAR method 
gives a lot of power for the hypothesis testing, but in turn may reject too many nulls 
(type 1 errors). On the other hand, the use of the portfolio method fails to measure all 
relevant information when aggregating individual events to calendar time portfolios. 
This reduces the power of the hypothesis testing i.e (type 2 errors.)  
 
Lyon et al. (1999) study improved methods for the long-term testing. The first method 
is constructed around the basic BHAR method, but Lyon et al. improve the estimates by 
controlling for the reported biases (a detailed discussion follows) in order to decrease 
the misspecifications of test statistics. The second method is based on calendar-time 
portfolios where abnormal retuns are calculated for sample firms. The first model for 
calendar time-returns for a portfolio is estimated using a regression of the Fama-French 
three factor model (equation 3). The estimated αi intercept denotes a test for null 
hypothesis that the mean monthly excess return for a portfolio is zero.  
 
The second method employed by Lyon et al. is for calculating Mean Monthly Calendar-
Time Abnormal Returns. For an event period of three to five years, abnormal returns for 
portfolios are calculated first. Then for each calendar month i mean abnormal returns 
(MARt) across firms in the portfolio is calculated: 
 
 
 
 
Where n is the number of stocks in the portfolio, and xit describes the weight when 
abnormal returns are equal -or value-weighted. The grand mean monthly abnormal 
returns (MMAR) can be then calculated as: 
 
 
 
 
 
A very contemporary study by Jegadeesh and Karceski (2009) states that methods 
suggested by Lyon et al. (1999) are now commonly used in studies concentrating on the 
long-term performance of corporate events. They however are concerned about some 
misspecifications and limitations in the Lyon et al. findings and suggestions. Therefore 
Jegadeesh and Karceski develop improved methods for long-term testing designed to 
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overcome the problems in Lyon et al. They perform the testing using the same data 
sample employed by Lyon et al. and their models are designed to take into consideration 
the similar characteristics of sample companies (e.g same industry) and also the 
possibility of multiple inclusions in the sample (i.e overlapping returns). Jegadeesh and 
Karceski propose two models for autocorrelation-consistent test statistics. These models 
are presented as: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where SC_t is the Hansen and Hodrick (1980) estimator which allows correlation across 
monthly cohort results but assumes heteroskedasticity. The other estimator is HSC_t 
which allows heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. (See Jegadeesh and Karceski 
2009 for a detailed presentation of the estimator construction.)  
 
4.2.2. Problems with long-run event studies 
 
Because the aim of this study is to concentrate on the long-run performance of the 
acquirers it`s imperative to consider some methodological problems that may arise. 
Lately, there has been vivid discussion about how the long-term testing should be 
conducted and which methods should be used.    
Dimson and Marsh (1986) show that discarding the size effect when conducting a long-
horizon event study causes distortion in the test results, and therefore should be 
controlled as part of the testing. Later studies by Fama and French (1992, 1993) and 
Barber and Lyon (1997) confirm this.  A conflicting result is reported by Lyon et al. 
(1999) who find that controlling for size and the book-to-market isn`t enough to 
produce well-specified test statistics.  
 
As reported in Kothari and Warner and Barber and Lyon (1997) long-horizon event 
studies tend to produce biased test results. Part of the biases is caused by using the 
conventional t-statistic to measure the statistical significance of the abnormal returns. 
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Rau and Vermaelen (1998) report that the t-statistic suffers from assumptions of: 
normality, stationary and time independence of observations. Jegadeesh and Karceski 
(2009) state that in their tests of long-term performance of conventional t-statistics, their 
results imply that the in the case of industry clustering or overlapping returns the t-tests 
are miss-specified. They suspect that the reason is that the “…standard errors in a 
random sample understate the true standard errors p. 109.” To avoid these problems 
Lyon et al. (1999) advocate the use of bootstrapped t-statistics in favor of the 
conventional t-test. (See Lyon et al. 1999 for a detailed discussion of the bootstrap 
measure) 
 
Kothari and Warner (1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997) show that, the use of the CAR 
method alone for testing the long-horizon performance is susceptible for biases which 
can lead to flawed test results and indicate e.g. abnormal returns where they don`t exists 
compared to the BHAR method. They report that a survivor bias is possible in long-run 
event studies, where sample firms are tracked for the post-event period but firms which 
are included in the reference portfolio might start trading after the event month. 
Rebalancing bias arises when the compounded returns are calculated differently for a 
weighted market index and the sample firms. Also, skewness bias is caused by positive 
skewness in the distribution of long-run abnormal returns. Lyon et al. (1999) add cross-
sectional dependance and a bad model of asset prising as causes for misspecification 
and add that the choice of methods for the calculation of the abnormal returns will 
determine if and how these factors affect the misspecification. Finally, Kothari (2001) 
lists three problems with the long-horizon event studies: risk estimation, data problems 
and lack of a market theory of market inefficiency. 
 
Fama (1998) critizes both models for being susceptible for bad-model problems 
especially for long-term studies, because when the average abnormal returns are 
calculated over a long-horizon (compounded) it eventually becomes statistically 
significant. Antoniou et al. (2006) add that cross-sectional dependance is caused by 
companies which undertake several acquisitions during the long observation period, 
causing their measured monthly returns to become non-independent because of the 
overlapping of monthly returns.  
 
Because of findings by e.g Gregory (1997), Betton et al. (2008) and Dutta and Jog 
(2009), who report that the choice of the comparable benchmarks -or portfolios 
significantly influence the test results and ultimately the conclusions drawn from them. 
Antoniou et al. (2006) show that in their research, results for BHAR returns were 
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restricted only to equal-weighted results but they couldn`t find any underperformance 
using value-weighting. Kothari and Warner (2006) add that despite the problems with 
comparable return benchmarks, their use is still necessary in order to isolate the 
increment effect a single event has on a security price performance.  
 
As a conclusion it can be noted that Kothari and Warner (1997) and Barber and Lyon 
(1997) strongly favour the BHAR method and suggest that for future studies the use of 
nonparametric procedures like the bootstrapping method as ways to reduce the 
misspecification of long-term testing. Fama (1998) and Lyon et al. (1999) recommend 
that for long-run studies, researchers should apply the BHAR-method with 
bootstrapping and also use calendar-time portfolios for the calculation of abnormal 
returns.   
 
Antoniou et al. (2006) and Jegadeesh and Karceski (2009) comment that the 
bootstrapping method is also susceptible for errors as it assumes that sample firm 
abnormal returns are independent. But because of the cyclical and clustering nature of 
M&A, stock returns become positively cross-correlated and thus, test statistics which 
assume observation independence become overstated. Therefore they strongly advocate 
that future long-term studies would take the cross-correlation of sample stocks in to 
consideration in order to obtain reliable statistical results.  
 
In the end, much is known on how to make long-horizon event studies more accurate 
but so far a method that could be completely trusted doesn`t exist. Also compared to 
short-event studies long-horizon studies lack the power to succesfully measure the 
abnormal returns inside and outside of the event window. The longer the horizon, the 
worst are the results. (Kothari and Warner 2006.) 
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5. DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents the methods used in the research paper, the sample for the study 
and also the hypotheses for the study of the long-term performance of Finnish publicly 
traded companies from January 1995 to June 2006 which complete acquisitions. As this 
research paper uses the event study method, all required definitions are presented next. 
 
Event study method is usually applied to study short-term abnormal returns where the 
observed event period could be really short, usually denoted by e.g. [-5, 5], and the 
studied event is included in the observation period. This research paper uses the event 
study method to evaluate long-term performance and also the market model to estimate 
the average returns for the observation period. The market model that is used in this 
study is by definitions similar to equation number (2).   
 
The average returns from the market model are estimated from the time period of [-360, 
-30] i.e. 360 days before the first announcement date to 30 days before it. This is done 
to obtain reliable estimates for the company alpha and beta estimates and also to avoid 
the possible build-up (e.g. Halpern 1983 mentions information leaks) related to stock 
returns. To minimize data lost some firms which are included in the data set have a 
shorter estimation period.  
 
This study concentrates on the long-run post-merger performance and this event 
window is denoted by [40,750] i.e. beginning 40 days after the first announcement date 
to 750 days after. The three year period is chosen because the majority of studies 
assessing the long-term performance uses it, and it is long enough to sufficiently 
evaluate the effects of the M&A.  
 
After the interesting event and the observation period are both determined, a data set for 
the study must be obtained. For this study, the data is received from the Thompson One 
Banker Deals thorough the Department of Accounting and Finance of University of 
Vaasa. Additional data is gathered from the databases of Helsinki School of Economics 
(Helecon) and Kauppalehti Online and also from the ETLA database to obtain the 
necessary accounting information. 
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5.1. Portfolio formation 
 
After the interesting event has been chosen and event periods have been determined, 
criteria for streamlining the original data sample must be chosen to determine which 
companies are included in the study or why they are left out. Depending on the 
completed long-term studies, researchers use different excluding methods of factors 
when refining the original data. Loughran and Vijh (1997) discard target or acquiring 
companies which are trading at less than three dollars on the effective date. Gregory 
(1997, 2005) Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) exclude acquirers that have a market 
value less than 10M£. Dutta and Jog (2009) exclude firms from the financial sector 
from their sample but include all acquisitions regardless of their size. Campa and 
Hernando (2006) leave out acquisitions where the buyer already owned at least 50% off 
the target company (a toehold). Similarly, Rosen (2006) doesn`t include toeholds where 
acquirers gradually increase the size of their holding and also includes only acquisition 
valued at least 10% relative to the acquirer. Rosen also requires that afterwards the 
acquirer owns at least 90% of the target to be considered as a merger. 
 
In this study, the following requirements are adopted: 
 
–The acquisition is listed as completed in the original data sample. 
 
–Sufficient stock return data must be available for the estimation purposes of the market 
model and also companies must have available accounting information for the gathering 
of their P/E and P/B values. If the bidder has had two or stock series listed, the one with 
a higher liquidity is included in the sample. 
 
–The acquisition has to be valued at least 10% compared to the acquirers book-value. 
This is required to study acquisitions of greater significance. The 10 % cut-off rate is 
also included in the OMXH Harmonized Disclosure Rules (2008) and as Ali-Yrkkö 
(2002) reports a majority of acquisitions made by Finnish companies have been of small 
targets so this limitation ensures that economically significant acquisitions are studied. 
Although the 10% cut-off rate might be somewhat arbitrary, e.g. Rosen (2006) mentions 
that his main research results hold also for acquisitions valued 5% to 25% relative to 
acquirers` size.  
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–Toeholds are allowed, if the acquirer doesn`t control over 50 % of the target before the 
acquisition, but does own at least 50 % afterwards, and at the same time the acquisition 
is at least 10 % relative to the acquirers book-value. Again, this limitation is required for 
the purpose of studying acquisitions of greater significance, as usually the acquirers just 
increases their overall holding to just over 50 % i.e usually the required level for a 
majority ownership, but the acquisition itself might be insignificant.  
 
An un-necessary exclusion of firms that do not survive the full post-merger period could 
lead to survivorship bias. An elimination of non-survivors with negative returns would 
bias the sample performance estimates upwards. This bias may affect both the acquirers 
and also control samples used as benchmarks. Still, it`s unclear what kind of an effect 
the survivorship bias might have, in case of a merger or acquisition it could be positive 
and in case of a bankruptcy or liquidation negative. If both samples have similar 
elimination rates, the effect could be possibly canceled out. (Barber and Lyon 1997:356; 
Sudarsanam and Mahate 2003.) 
 
For this data set, the elimination rate is only 3,4% where as Sudarsanam and Mahate 
(2003) report a 15,2% exit rate for non-survivors, a number previously shown to be 
normal with UK acquisitions. In the case where an acquirer itself becomes a target, the 
missing stock data for the three-year period is replaced by relevant benchmark return 
following the reasoning in Mitchell and Stafford (2000). 
 
After the data selection is completed, all surviving companies are assigned to portfolios 
and from the original sample, 117 M&A survive the selection criteria when allowing for 
multiple acquisitions and 87 acquisitions survive the Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
selection process i.e. only one acquisition per company is allowed for the three-year 
post-merger period. In table 1 is shown the descriptive statistics from the formation of 
the P/E and P/B portfolios. 
 
The pre-merger valuations are calculated three months before the announcement date 
and companies are included to portfolios based on this valuation. If the required 
accounting information is unavailable the closest accounting release to the 
announcement date is used to minimize data lost. The surviving sample of companies is 
then divided to three equal parts based on their pre-merger valuation. These portfolios 
are labelled glamour, neutral and value. Again to minimize data lost when forming 
portfolios based on their P/E ratio, companies that reported negative earnings are 
gathered to a separate portfolio denoted by neg. P/E. So in total, four P/E portfolios and 
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three P/B portfolios are formed and after the formation no rebalancing is conducted 
following the reasoning in Mitchell and Stafford (2000). 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of P/B and P/E portfolios. 
P/B portfolios (allowing multiple bids) P/E portfolios (allowing multiple bids) 
           
 
N Median Low High 
 
N Median Low High 
     
 
     
Value 39 1,10 0,28 1,56 Value 33 21,37 4,9 35,4 
 
    
 
     
Neutral 39 2,16 1,57 2,95 Neutral 33 70,4 37,0 195,1 
 
    
 
     
Glamour 39 5,30 3,00 80,91 Glamour 33 501,4 202  
12220 
     
(Neg P/E) 18    
     
 
     
All acquirers 
(N=117) 
2,14   All acquirers 
(N=99) 
 73,3   
           
 
 
As can be seen from table 1, for the P/B portfolios the median P/B value for the 
glamour portfolio is 2,45 times the median of neutral portfolio and almost five times the 
median of the value portfolio. Even higher deviation is observable in the P/E portfolios. 
There, the median of the glamour portfolio is over seven times the median of neutral 
portfolio and astounding 23,46 times the median of the value portfolio. The reported 
absolute high and low values in the P/E are also extremely high. Although the P/E ratio 
doesn`t have any theoretical (positive) limitations, the low value of 202 and a high value 
of 12220 are very unprecedented, and are a direct result of the baseless valuation that 
several companies had in the turn of the millennium. Even the reported P/E ratio for the 
neutral portfolio is unfamiliarly high. 
 
Table 2. includes more descriptive statistics for the full sample. The merger activity for 
the study period seems to increase towards the turn of the millennium, where almost 
40% of the total M&A is completed between 1999 and 2001. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of method of payment and size. 
Method of Payment Descriptive statistics 
Year of 
Acquisition 
N Cash Mi-
xed 
Equi-
ty 
Portfolio 
Size 
N Median 
€ 
Low 
€ 
High € 
1995 7 1 3 3       
1996 4 3 - 1 Small 39 49,0M€ 10,4
M€ 
120M€ 
1997 6 5 - 1 
1998 9 3 2 4 Medium 39 308M€ 121,
2M€ 
772,7M€ 
1999 10 5 1 4 
2000 21 7 1 13 Large 39 1,89B€ 812,
8M€ 
12,78B€ 
2001 14 9 1 4 
2002 9 8 - 1  
2003 7 6 - 1 
2004 8 6 1 1 
2005 10 4 2 4 
2006 (June) 5 1 4 - 
     
∑ 117 65 15 37 
 
 
After the global economic downturn the number of acquisitions quickly drops, and 
again, after the economy started to recover the M&A activity seems to be on the rise. 
Table 2 also shows the statistics for the size portfolios. The sizes for the bidders vary a 
lot, ranging from 10,4 M€ to 12,78 B€ measured by market capitalization. 
 
In this sample, over a half of the M&A are financed using cash only, about one third 
using equity only and 15 M&A are financed by the acquirer using both cash and equity 
(denoted by mixed). Faccio and Masulis (2005) report that for their European sample a 
majority of deals is financed using cash only (about 80%) with the lowest procentages 
reported in Finland (66%) and Norway (69%). For US Betton et al. (2008) report that 
the mixed form of payment is the most used followed by all equity deals and all cash 
deals, and for the UK Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) state that over 60% of the deals in 
the sample are financed using the mixed method of payment and the rest spread between 
all equity and all cash deals. The uneven deviation creates also problems for the present 
study when drawing the statistical inferences for each of the portfolios. 
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5.2. Calculation of abnormal returns 
 
The abnormal returns for each stock in the portfolio are done by firstly calculating their 
daily abnormal returns: 
 
 
 
 
where ARit is the abnormal return for the stock in the portfolio on day t, Rit is the 
observed daily return and âi and βi parameters respectively are estimators calculated 
using the market model. After the abnormal returns for individual stocks are calculated, 
the long-run BHAR returns for stocks are then calculated using equation (5). 
 
The performance of the portfolios is then compared to the OMXH25 and OMXH 
general indexes, as many studies (e.g. Gregory 1997 and Rosen 2006) compare the 
long-term performance of the portfolios to the general stock indexes. The performance 
of an individual portfolio is then compared to the index using average abnormal buy-
and-hold returns, calculated as: 
 
 
 
 
where, ABHART is the average abnormal return across a portfolio of companies during 
a holding period T. 
 
5.3. Statistical significance 
 
In order to draw reliable conclusions about the calculated abnormal returns and their 
meaningfulness, a statistical method must be employ to test the null hypothesis. A 
standard t-test is used to observe if the BHAR returns are significantly different from 
zero and also if the calculated means differ significantly from one another. Although its` 
reported limitations, the t-test is and long has been used as the method for testing short –
and long-horizon post-event abnormal returns. In this study the following measure for 
testing the t-value is employed: 
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where, BHARit is the portfolios average ABHAR return and σBHARit is the cross-
sectional standard deviation of 36-month mean abnormal returns. 
 
 
5.4. Theoretical background  
 
This section presents the theoretical background of the testable hypotheses. The main 
hypotheses tested in this study are constructed based on findings by Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) in the US, and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) in the UK, who find that 
acquirers pre-merger valuation affects the long-term performance of M&A. As proxies 
of the valuation, these studies use acquirers P/E –and B/M-ratios, which are also chosen 
for this research paper. Also hypotheses for the method of payment and size are tested. 
The method of payment hypotheses was also tested by Rau and Vermaelen and 
Sudarsanam and Mahate who show that cash financed acquisitions outperform those 
financed with equity. Because of findings by Bauman et al. (1998) whom show that 
value firms generally outperform similar sized glamour firms, I also test if acquirer size 
affects the long-term post-merger performance.  
 
5.4.1. P/E ratio  
 
The price-earnings ratio (later P/E) is a simple and much used performance ratio. It`s 
the current share price divided by most recent reported earnings per share. In a sector 
level it is the current market value of all sector companies divided by total sector 
earnings. A high P/E ratio implies that investors have high growth expectations for a 
specific company, although irregular events affecting the share price naturally affects 
the P/E ratio. A divergence of a sector average P/E might mean that a company is under 
–or overvalued. Also and evident problem using the P/E ratio is that it uses accounting 
profits instead of expected cash flows. The P/E ratio could also be considered as a 
payback period, where e.g a P/E value of 18.7 would mean that it will take 18 or 19 
years to recover the initial investment back. (Pike and Neale 2006: 45, 97.) 
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Basu (1977) was one of the first to study how a firms P/E ratio affects its performance. 
Basu formed portfolios consisting of firms with similar P/E ratios and compared their 
risk-return performance. Also the return of the low P/E portfolio was compared to a 
portfolio constructed with random stocks to test the efficient market hypothesis. Basu 
shows that portfolios with the lowest P/E ratios outperformed portfolios with a higher 
P/E ratio, a result generally robust when adjusting for the risk accordingly. Basu 
concludes that the information concerning the P/E ratio wasn`t completely assessed in 
the security prices as quickly as it should have been, at least not during the studied time 
frame. This result implies that the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis 
didn`t hold but couldn`t been completely denied.  
 
Booth, Martikainen, Perttunen and Yli-Olli (1994) tested the E/P anomaly using US and 
Finnish data for the period of 1976 – 1986. Their results confirm the existence of the 
E/P anomaly in the US and also confirm the similar existence in Finland. Booth et al. 
conclude that the results are interesting considering the major differences between the 
Finnish stock market and other major stock markets. Pätäri and Leivo (2009) also 
examine how portfolios constructed using e.g the E/P ratios perform against a market 
portfolio in Finland. They report that a value portfolio constructed on the basis of the 
E/P ratio outperforms the market portfolio statistically significantly during the 
observation period from 1993 to 2008, but conclude that when a more precise measures 
for kurtosis and skewness are used, the result isn`t significant no more.  
 
Anderson and Brooks (2006) offer additional evidence on performance of the P/E ratio. 
Studying UK firms from 1975 to 2003, Anderson and Brooks are able to show that 
increasing the number of years from which the P/E is calculated, significantly increases 
the predictive power of the P/E ratio. When using eight years of returns compared to 
one, the observed value premium between glamour and value deciles is almost doubled. 
Anderson and Brooks note that predictive power of the P/E ratio isn`t linear (years two 
and three perform badly) and also mention that the bid-ask spread and liquidity had 
effect on the value premium although marginal.   
 
Welch and Goyal (2008) study several factors which in the financial literature have 
been suggested as predictors for the equity premium, one being the E/P ratio. They 
employ a conventional ordinary least squares (OLS) approach but statistical significance 
of the variables is computed using bootstrapped F-values. Using the S&P 500 index 
returns from 1926 to 2005, Welch and Goyal state that for the E/P ratio, the general 
results show insignificant predictive performance and only vaguely significant 
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performance on certain specific time periods. Overall, almost all models based on these 
predictors are unstable and perform badly. Welch and Goyal do admit that their analysis 
are simple but nevertheless offer additional information of the validity of these models 
and how to improve them in the future.  
 
A very recent study by Barnhart and Giannetti (2009) studies also the predictive power 
of E/P ratio (earnings yield) and its` predictive power in the US. The research divides 
the E/P ratio to winner and loser components based on quarterly earnings releases from 
companies, and measures the future stock return capabilities of these. Barnhart and 
Giannetti find that the E/P ratio has predictive power for S&P 500 quarterly returns but 
report that the negative earnings component (denoted EPLOS) is the main reason 
behind this. They also report that when implementing market-timing strategies for 
assessing the forecasting capabilities of the earnings measures, only the EPLOS 
measure is able to generate excess returns which leads Barnhart and Giannetti to 
conclude that “… the negative earnings component is the driving factor behind the 
aggregate earnings-price yield and in our ability to significantly predict future market 
returns p. 83 ”. 
 
Firms considered as glamour acquirers are those which have high values as result from 
a prior stock market performance. These stocks have high P/E and high market to book 
value ratios. Inversely companies with low P/E and market to book values are 
considered as value stocks. They could be undervalued but may offer positive value 
gains in the future. More precisely, glamour firms have high growth rates and value 
firms have low growth rates (Sudarsanam and Mahate 2003.) Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) state that for glamour firms, the ultimate decision makers (i.e large stock holders 
or a board of directors) are more likely to accept acquisition proposals from company 
management than value firm owners, whose company may have have suffered from a 
poor track record and thus are more careful at approving major transactions. Rau and 
Vermaelen report that this means that company directors aren`t suffering from the 
hubris and therefore these acquisitions “…should create shareholder value rather than 
destroy it p.226”.  
 
International evidence of the performance for value vs. growth is provided by Bauman 
et al. (1998). They study the performance of value vs. growth stocks in 21 countries, to 
test if value stocks outperform growth stocks in non US-markets also. The study period 
is from 1986 – 1996 and stocks are placed into portfolios based on four different 
valuation methods one being the P/E ratio. The results for the full sample show that 
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value stocks (measured by the P/E ratio) outperform glamour stocks on a 1% 
significance level. 
 
As an explanation for the underperformance of M&A Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 
propose a performance extrapolation hypothesis, where market participants would give 
too much weight for the previous success of a bidding company concerning the 
announced M&A bid. More specifically, Rau and Vermaelen argue that bidding 
company managers are overoptimistic about their own abilities to manage the 
forthcoming acquisition, and so, would be infected by hubris. They find evidence 
supporting the hypothesis and show that markets are overly optimistic about the 
prospects of glamour bidders and vice versa, overly pessimistic about value bidders 
whom aren`t infected by hubris. Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) test the same 
hypothesis for the long-term performance of M&A in the UK and find also supporting 
evidence for it. While Rau and Vermaelen (1998) don`t use the P/E ratio as a proxy for 
the glamour/value status, Sudarsanam and Mahate advocate the use of it as “since P/E is 
more widely used as a valuation tool in acquisition valuation… p.303”. This leads to the 
first hypothesis, stated as: 
 
H1: Low P/E acquirers (value acquirers) outperform high P/E acquirers 
(glamour acquirers) 
 
5.4.2. B/M ratio 
 
The book-to-market ratio (B/M) has become a factor as a determinant of future expected 
returns. It has been shown that the B/M ratio explains a significant portion of cross-
sectional variation in average returns. This could be because the B/M ratio proxies for 
future cash flows, and thus is a proxy of cash flows for the current price level. More 
specifically, holding expected cash flows constant, a positive increase in discount rate 
leads to a lower market value but to a higher B/M ratio. Still, the observed effects have 
been weaker on larger firms and the results might also been somewhat affected by data 
mining. (Kothari and Shanken 1997; Pontiff and Schall 1998.)  
 
The Price-to-Book (P/B) value is calculated as market value of a company’s market 
value of its assets divided by their book value. As measure of the current valuation, the 
higher the P/B value the higher is the appropriate valuation used by investors. A relative 
high market valuation, high profitability etc. are factors which increase the observed 
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market value but don`t affect the book-value. The P/B ratio follows the development of 
the return of assets (ROA), i.e. the higher is the ROA the higher is the value of P/B 
value. Companies with high P/B ratios are considered to have high levels of profitability 
and growth or those that have intangible assets that carry growth potential. (Kallunki et 
al. 2009.) 
 
An influential study by Fama and French (1992) reports that BE/ME factor has a 
stronger relation to average returns than the size effect. For the research period from 
July 1963 to December 1990 portfolios formed on the basis of BE/ME ranks, show 
strong positive relation between average return and BE/ME. The reported effect is twice 
as large as the difference between average returns of the smallest and largest size 
portfolios. Furthermore, the combination of ME and the BE/ME factors include the 
apparent roles of leverage and E/P ratio in average returns. Also an important finding is 
that on average, low BE/ME companies have continuously high earnings compared to 
high BE/ME firms which tend to have persistently low earnings.  
 
Fama and French (1993) expand their earlier research and test how time-series 
regressions especially their slopes (i.e. “factor loadings that unlike size or BE/ME have 
a clear interpretation as risk factor sensitivities for bonds as well as for stocks” p.4) and 
R2 values show if size and BE/ME risk factors capture shared variations of stocks and 
bonds that other factors can`t explain. The results prove that portfolios made to mimic 
risk factors related to size and BE/ME capture this variation, depend less of what else is 
included in the time-series regressions. A result what Fama and French consider as 
evidence that size and BE/ME are proxies for the sensitivity of common risk factors in 
stock returns. The researchers do however point out that these factors alone can`t 
explain the substantial difference of average returns of stocks and the one-month bills, 
this is attributable for a market factor.  
 
Kothari and Shanken (1997) test the predictive powers of B/M ratio and the dividend 
yield on the US market. They use a bootstrap simulation to test the null hypothesis i.e 
no predictive power, and also to test the economic significance of its determinants, i.e 
the B/M ratio and the dividend yield. For a time period from 1926–91, they find 
evidence that both ratios track the time-series variation in expected real one-year stock 
returns. Still, Kothari and Shanken state that despite the success of the B/M ratio in 
explaining cross-sectional variations of stock returns, it appears that the forecasting 
power varies from time to time, and therefore should be remembered when making 
47 
 
future investment decisions. Welch and Goyal (2008) report that the B/M had excellent 
predictive power until the oil shocks of the 1970s, but perform indifferently afterwards.   
 
Also motivated by the Fama and French (1992) study, Pontiff and Schall (1998) 
investigate how an aggregate B/M ratio forecasts market returns on Dow Jones 
Industrial Index (DJIA). They report a similar result as Kothari and Shanken (1997) i.e 
the B/M ratio predicts market returns, but additionally report its` capability to predict 
the excess returns of small firms over large firms.  Pontiff and Schall find also evidence 
of a cross-sectional relationship between the B/M ratio and cash flows and recommend 
that future research should be conducted on this relation in order to better understand 
the relation of B/M and returns.  
 
On an international level Bauman et al. (1998) report that portfolios constructed using 
the P/B value and dividing the sample companies to value and growth firms, value 
portfolios outperform glamour firms on a statistically significant 1%-level, a result 
consistent with previous US studies. On a country level value stocks performed best in 
Australia, France, Germany and Japan whereas growth firms outperformed in the UK. 
In Finland, Pätäri and Leivo (2009) report that during their study period neither the 
glamour nor value portfolios constructed using the B/P values, statistically differ from 
the returns of the market portfolio which is an unusual finding. They do report that 
value portfolios nevertheless perform better than the glamour portfolios. 
 
Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2003) study what part of cross-sectional dispersion in 
book-to-market ratios is caused by variation of expected stock returns, and how much is 
caused by variation in expected cash-flow growth. They examine the US markets for a 
long time period and also study international panel data. Cohen et al. report that their 
findings suggests that 20 to 25 % of the book-to-market dispersion is due to dispersion 
in expected stock returns, and rest due to dispersion in expected profitability. Cohen et 
al. also report that for value strategies (long on value stocks, short on growth stocks), 
the expected return on value-minus-growth coincides with times when the value spread 
is high and the market is cheap i.e. it`s time varying.  
 
Eleswarapu and Reinganum (2004) also study the predictability of stock returns 
focusing on value and growth stocks. They report that annual excess returns of the stock 
market (over the risk-free rate) are negatively related with past returns of glamour 
stocks. While Eleswarapu and Reinganum are unable to find any predictive power for 
value stocks, a glamour stock portfolio continues to predict future stock returns. This 
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finding implies that the probability of a major stock market decline increases following 
periods when glamour stocks have performed exceptionally well. Welch and Goyal 
(2008) also suggests further research on e.g. predicting disaggregated returns of value 
and growth stocks. They speculate that value stocks could respond more strongly to 
dividends, while growth stocks could respond more to book-to-market factors. 
 
As discussed earlier, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) 
both use B/M proxy as a valuation method for value and growth acquirers. Both studies 
report that value firms clearly outperform glamour acquirers, thus I construct the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Low ME/BE acquirers (value acquirers) outperform high ME/BE 
acquirers (glamour acquirers) 
 
5.4.3. Method of payment 
 
The chosen method for the payment of the M&A is an important one for the acquirer, as 
they can make a decision to use either cash or issue new equity to finance the M&A. 
Several studies have examined the reasons that influence the choice of payment and also 
how it affects the overall outcome of the M&A afterwards. Also the current valuation of 
the acquirer has been shown to influence the chosen method, e.g. overvalued companies 
have an incentive to use their stock to finance the acquisition and use cash otherwise. 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) describe this as an adverse selection problem where the 
acquirer and the target have a problem on how to adequately value the counterpart if 
one or the other has private information of the true value of their company. 
 
Several studies have also examined if the type of the merger (a merger or a tender offer) 
and how it has been has financed affects the long-term performance of the acquirer. For 
US e.g. Agrawal et al. (1992) find but don`t report that tender offers completed using 
equity fare worse than those financed with cash and they find a similar result for 
mergers also. Loughran and Vijh (1997) show that mergers completed using equity earn 
a statistically significant negative returns of -25% compared to similar sized reference 
stocks, and also that tender offers financed with cash earn statistically significant 
positive returns of 61,7% compared to reference stocks. They though are a bit cautious 
when interpreting the results, as they could be limited to the type of the acquisition or 
caused by overoptimistic beliefs of markets or managers. In the UK e.g. Gregory (1997) 
49 
 
reports that equity financed M&A perform worse compared to cash financed and the 
initial findings by Antoniou et al. (2006) confirm this but when they apply the corrected 
t-test method the observed underperformance of equity financed M&A disappears. 
 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) study also European M&A markets, stating that European 
markets offer an excellent opportunity to examine several factors related to M&As 
which don`t exists in the US markets. Faccio and Masulis argue that when making 
M&A finance decisions, the bidder is facing a choice between cash –or equity finance 
and their different implications. Cash offers e.g usually require more debt financing 
leading to possible distress problems and equity financing in the other hand to corporate 
control issues. These corporate control issues might be related to stock holding changes 
or the ultimate power to control a firm. Faccio and Masulis show that corporations 
prefer to use cash financing when there is a possibility of surrendering shareholder 
voting power. On the other hand, bidders’ frequency to use equity finance increases if 
the measures of their financial conditions get worse. 
 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) test a means of payment hypothesis that long-run abnormal 
returns for acquirers will be on average negative in equity-financed and positive in cash-
financed deals. They find some supporting evidence for this hypothesis, reporting that 
in the merger sample bidders typically pay using equity and cash in the tender offers. 
More presicely glamour bidders pay with stock more frequently as compared to value 
bidders but the means of payment hypothesis cannot predict the significant difference in 
the tender offer sample were glamour acquirers fare much worse than value bidders. 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) conduct a similar test in the UK reporting supporting 
results. They find that in high P/E portfolios there is higher tendency to use equity as a 
source of financing the bid than cash, and an opposite result in the low P/E portfolio. 
They also report evidence that for the long-term post-merger period, cash bidders 
generally statistically outperform equity bidders. These findings lead to the following 
hypotheses: 
 
H3: Bidders using cash as a method of payment will outperform bidders 
using equity as a method of payment 
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5.4.4. Size 
 
An observable size effect would have important implications to both practioners and 
academics. For asset management purposes the notion that small firms could yield 
higher returns is particularly interesting, and for academics too, because a finding of a 
risk-based explanation for the size effect would affect the standing academic view of 
alternative asset prising models and thus impact the current research methods like the 
event-study method and fund performance evaluation. It`s also of importance to study if 
the size effect exists on international level, as various factors and characteristics like 
corporate finance decisions or the level of market efficiency varies from country to 
country. (van Dijk 2007.) 
 
Banz (1981) is one of the earliest studies concentrating on the size effect and how it 
affects average returns. Banz studies stocks listed in NYSE in the 1936-1975 period and 
finds that small firms had, on average, higher risk-adjusted returns than the stock of 
large firms. He shows that size effect isn`t linear, varies over time (it has a negative 
value in 1946 – 1955) and it`s most pronounced for the smallest firms in the sample 
while the differences between medium and large firms are insignificant. In the UK 
Dimson and Marsh (1986) show that a size effect causes distortions in long-run event 
studies, and thus produce different results depending if an equal –or a value-weighted 
performance method is used. They strongly advocate that size-adjusted methods should 
be used in event studies. 
 
The Fama and French (1992, 1993) studies which report that company size (measured 
by a stock`s price times shares outstanding, ME) is an important factor explaining the 
cross-sectional variation in stock returns. When constructing portfolios based on size 
only and observing their performance the Fama and French (1992) study confirms the 
findings in Banz (1981) i.e there seems to exist a strong negative relationship between 
size and average return. Fama and French also show that the smallest decile of firms 
outperforms the largest firms by 0,74% per month, and that small companies have 
higher returns in all stock indices which they study. In Fama and French (1993) they 
expand their previous study by testing stock and bond returns. The results confirm that 
portfolios designed to mimic size and BE/ME factors capture the normal variation in 
stock returns and therefore size and the BE/ME factors proxy for the sensitivity to 
common risk factors in stock returns. Fama and French note that, in almost all BE/ME 
quintiles, average returns tend to diminish when moving from small –to bigger-size 
portfolios. 
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Fama and French (2008) paper discusses several previously observed anomalies, their 
causes and empirical shortcomings when studying them. They argue that e.g. when 
studies are reporting results for equal-weighted returns for different size decile 
portfolios, the researchers usually are focused on comparing the extreme size deciles 
(large vs. micro cap) which Fama and French mention could be a problem as micro cap 
stocks account only for roughly 3% of the overall index values but 60% of the total 
number of stocks. Fama and French show that when measuring equal-weighted returns 
micro cap stocks increase the average equal-weight return considerably. The opposite is 
observed when comparing the value-weighted returns which are dominated by large cap 
stocks, now the observed average value-weight retuns across all stocks is close to 
average large cap portfolio return. Fama and French report that their results imply that 
the size effect itself is strongest among the micro caps and has some effect on small and 
large companies and their average returns. 
  
Pätäri and Leivo (2009) examine if the size (Fama-French SMB factor) effect has any 
impact on the observed value premiums when it is added to the regression models. 
When comparing value and glamour portfolios Pätäri and Leivo report that although 
size does create changes to the originally observed results, they aren`t statistically 
significant leading them to conclude that the size anomaly does not explain the value 
premium in Finland 
 
Moeller et al. (2004) focus on company size and how it affects the observed 
announcement period returns of M&A. For a large US sample they show that small 
acquirers make profitable acquisitions, although small in absolute dollar value, whereas 
large firms in the other hand make large acquisitions but also suffer large losses. Also, 
regardless of the payment used in the acquisition small firms display higher 
announcement period returns, results which are un-reversed over time (tested for 
different subsamples).  
 
Moeller et al. also study the reasons behind the observed size effect. They state that 
small firms use cash more likely than equity to finance the acquisitions and also that 
small and large firms have different characteristics which could help to explain the size 
effect. The authors also report that in their sample equally-weighted abnormal returns 
and similarly weighted abnormal dollar returns have opposite signs, an inclination of a 
size effect. In the UK, Antoniou et al. (2006) state that the significant long-run BHAR 
underperformance is observed only on equal-weighting and not in value-weighting 
leading them to suspect that small firms are cause for the underperformance.  
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Although studies which account both acquirer size and the valuation effects are scarce, 
international evidence is provided by Bauman et al. (1998) whom report that small non-
US companies fared considerably better than larger firms but that the observed quartile 
returns decrease as the quartile size increases. The reported return spread between the 
smallest –and largest cap is 11,2% (significant at 1% level) but Bauman et al. note that 
the sample median for the smallest portfolio is very small and the standard deviation 
very large. (See Fama and French 2008 for implications.)  
 
Bauman et al. further examined how value and growth firms performed in similar size 
deciles. They report that both the value –and the size effects influence the observed 
average returns in all size deciles. The smallest value firms when measured by their P/B 
value had the highest average returns in all size deciles (27,5%), and the largest value 
firms outperformed their glamour counterparts by the highest margin (7,4%). To test if 
similar value –and size effects are observable in Finnish M&A, I test the following 
hypothesis: 
 
 H4: Value acquirers will outperform similar sized glamour acquirers 
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6. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
This section presents the empirical findings of the current study. This study has 
concentrated on the long-term post-merger performance of Finnish acquirers. The 
empirical tests have been done for 117 and 87 companies for a three-year post-merger 
time period starting from the original announcement date of the merger. Previous 
chapter has described the methodological approach and the statistical tests which have 
been used.  
 
 
6.1. Do acquirers underperform? 
 
In table 3 is shown the empirical results for the whole sample, the results are presented 
for multiple –and single bids. The results for the whole sample show that acquirers 
underperform following their merger bids. Also the choice of leaving multiple bids out 
of the sample doesn`t alter the reported results as they also underperform on a 5%-
significance level. Multiple bidders have negative returns of -73,44% and -71,76% and 
single bidders -51,42% and -49,23%. All reported t-values are significantly negative at 
the 5%-level and appear to be very similar for both benchmark indexes, the differences 
between means aren`t significant for multiple or single bidders.  
 
 
Table 3. The long-term performance of single –and multiple bidders. 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns for Acquirers 
         
   
OMXH 
index 
   
OMXH25 
index 
 
         
 
N 
ABHARpf
% 
Std. 
ABHAR 
T-
statistics N 
ABHARpf
% 
Std.     
ABHAR 
T-
statistic
s 
         
Multiple 
bids 
11
7 -73,44 3,304 -2,055** 117 -71,76 3,281 -2,022** 
    
 
   
 
Single bid 
 87         -51,42 2,473 -2,229** 87 -49,23 2,442 -2,162** 
         
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
ABHARpf% is the sum of the portfolios BHARit and Std.ABHAR denotes the standard 
deviation of the portfolio calculated from equation (12). 
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The results are also very similar to other international studies. In the US e.g. Agrawal et 
al. (1992) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998) report that acquirers significantly 
underperform, and in the UK the same is reported by e.g. Gregory (1997) and 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003). Overall the results suggest that acquirers clearly 
underperform, but it could be too premature to confirm these results. As has been 
discussed earlier, several problems and biases affect the outcome of long-term event-
studies and ultimately the conclusions drawn from them. Next, a more detailed look is 
provided of the reported results as I further evaluate different causes affecting the long-
run results.  
 
6.1.1. Results for P/E portfolios  
 
This section presents the empirical findings of the Finnish post-merger performance for 
both samples when portfolios are constructed based on the company pre-merger P/E 
ratio. 
 
Table 4 presents the empirical findings of value, neutral, glamour and the negative P/E 
portfolios compared to the OMXH general- and OMXH25 indexes. The results clearly 
show that on a 1% confidence-level, the neutral, glamour and the negative P/E 
portfolios underperform while the value portfolio seems to perform in a very similar 
way as both indexes. Only the value portfolios have a positive sign and abnormal 
returns of 0,96% and 1,35% although either isn`t close to being statistically significant. 
The negative abnormal returns for glamour, neutral and neg. P/E portfolios range from -
38,61% to -11,73%. Although the number of stocks in the negative P/E portfolio is less 
than in the others and thus not really an exact comparable to the other portfolios, the 
neg. P/E portfolio exhibits high negative abnormal returns and thus, high negative t-
values of -6,436 and -6,574 indicating that this portfolio (and the stocks included) suffer 
immensely after completing M&A. The performance of the neg. P/E portfolio is 
actually very similar to the glamour portfolio.  
 
The reported results also are very similar to those reported in e.g Rau and Vermalen 
(1998) for the US and in Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) for the UK. None of the 
portfolios seem to positively outperform their benchmark indexes, a similar result as in 
th UK, but Rau and Vermaelen report that value acquirers had positive abnormal retuns 
(7,4% for mergers). Bauman et al. (1998) finds also that on an international level, when 
portfolios are constructed using the P/E ratio, value firms outperform growth firms on a 
1%-significance level.  
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Table 4. P/E portfolios long-term performance.  
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns for Acquirers 
       
OMXH index 
       
 
N ABHARpf%  Std.ABHARpf T-statistics 
       
Value 33 0,96  0,029 0,209 
 
      
Neutral 33 -11,73  0,772 -2,646* 
 
     
 
Glamour 33 -38,61  0,990 -6,789* 
 
     
 
Neg.P/E 18 -20,75  0,744 -6,574* 
       
OMXH25 index 
       
 N ABHARpf%  Std.ABHARpf T-statistics 
       
Value 33 1,35  0,784 0,301 
 
      
Neutral 33 -11,88  0,769 -2,691* 
 
     
 
Glamour 33 -37,99  0,987 -6,697* 
 
     
 
Neg.P/E 18 -20,26  0,742 -6,436* 
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
ABHARpf is the sum of the portfolios BHARit and Std.ABHARpf denotes the standard 
deviation of the portfolio calculated from equation (12).   
 
 
In table 5 is reported the empirical findings using the Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
portfolio formation. The number of companies drops to 87 from 117 as multiple bidders 
are excluded from the sample. The overall results are strikingly similar to table 4. Value 
firms don`t display any statistically significant returns but neutral, glamour and the neg. 
P/E portfolios all earn statistically negative abnormal returns. Compared to table 4 the 
observed negative abnormal returns are now lower, ranging from -27,76% to -5,49%. 
Similar results are reported by Loughran and Vijh (1997). When they exclude multiple 
bidders from their sample, the results are similar as for the whole sample i.e acquirers 
underperform. 
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Table 5. P/E portfolios long-term performance (single bid allowed). 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns for Acquirers (P/E) 
      
OMXH index 
      
 
N ABHARpf% Std.ABHARpf T-statistics 
Value 25 -0,71 0,596 -0,239 
 
     
Neutral 25 -10,34 0,581 -3,558* 
 
   
 
 
Glamour 25 -27,76 0,727 -7,377* 
 
   
 
 
Neg. P/E 12 -14,23 1,095 -3,750* 
      
      
OMXH25 index 
      
 
N ABHARpf% Std.ABHARpf T-statistics 
Value 25 0,83 0,594 0,279 
 
     
Neutral 25 -8,23 0,579 -2,844* 
 
   
 
 
Glamour 25 -20,16 1,316 -3,063* 
 
   
 
 
Neg. P/E 12 -5,49 0,737 -2,149** 
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
In table 5 is reported the empirical findings using the Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
portfolio formation. The number of companies drops to 87 from 117 as multiple bidders 
are excluded from the sample. The overall results are strikingly similar to table 4. Value 
firms don`t display any statistically significant returns but neutral, glamour and the neg. 
P/E portfolios all earn statistically negative abnormal returns. Compared to table 4 the 
observed negative abnormal returns are now lower, ranging from -27,76% to -5,49%. 
Similar results are reported by Loughran and Vijh (1997). When they exclude multiple 
bidders from their sample, the results are similar as for the whole sample i.e acquirers 
underperform. 
 
Some peculiar changes though are worth mentioning. When comparing the performance 
of value firms in tables 4 and 5, it seems that in full sample they had positive signs for 
both benchmarks but in table 5 and compared to OMXH index they have a negative 
sign. What is also interesting is that reported the abnormal returns for glamour 
portfolios differ significantly from each other at a 1%-significance level, ranging from -
27,76% (OMXH) to -20,16% (OMXH25). Similar deviation wasn`t observed when 
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allowing multiple bids for acquirers. There is also an interesting difference with the 
standard deviations of these two. The Std.ABHARpf for the glamour portfolio is a lot 
lower when compared to OMXH index than OMXH25 index. The latter is also higher 
than what was reported in table 4 although the total number of stocks in the portfolio is 
lower. This finding implies that some stocks have a higher correlation with the OMXH 
index than with the OMXH25, but also that using several benchmarks is recommend, 
although it doesn`t alter the reported results. The t-values for the neg. P/E portfolio 
seem to vary also, but the result could be more of a product of the low number of stocks 
(N=12) which affects the statistical inferences. 
 
In the end, when using the P/E ratio as the valuation method, leaving multiple bidders 
out of the sample doesn`t change any of the previously reported results and based on the 
findings in tables 4 and 5, the results show that hypotheses H1 is strongly supported. 
 
6.1.2. Results for P/B portfolios 
 
This section presents the empirical findings of the Finnish post-merger performance for 
the full sample when the portfolios are constructed based on the company P/B ratio. 
 
Table 6 presents the performance of the P/B portfolios compared to the OMXH and 
OMXH25 indexes. The reported results show that only the glamour portfolio 
underperforms statistically significantly and the result is similar for both benchmarks. 
The glamour portfolios have very high negative abnormal returns of -53,37% and -
51,34%. These ABHARpf values for the glamour portfolios are six or seven times 
higher than those of value or neutral portfolios. Also the standard deviation of the 
glamour portfolio is the highest of the portfolios. The neutral portfolio has a t-value of -
1,45 which is close of being statistically significant at the 10% level when comparing to 
the OMXH index, but becomes only -1,356 for the OMXH25 index. An interesting 
result compared to P/E portfolios is the negative sign for the value portfolios. Although 
not statistically significant, it implies that value firms were unable to undertake 
profitable acquisitions, while e.g Rau and Vermaelen (1998) reported a statistically 
significant positive performance for value acquirers. 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
Table 6. P/B portfolios long-term performance. 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns for Acquirers 
       
OMXH index 
       
  
N ABHARpf% Std. ABHARpf T-Statistics 
       
Value 
 39 -6,84 0,948 -1,155 
 
      
Neutral 
 39 -8,21 0,907 -1,45 
 
      
Glamour 
 39 -51,34 1,415 -5,808* 
       
OMXH25 index 
       
  
N ABHARpf% Std. ABHARpf T-Statistics 
       
Value 
 39 -8,78 0,967 -1,45 
 
      
Neutral 
 39 -7,67 0,905 -1,356 
 
      
Glamour 
 39 -53,37 1,383 -6,180* 
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
In table 7 is shown the results when multiple bidders are left out of the sample. The 
results are quite similar to table 6 but some changes do appear. The value portfolios 
again don`t show any statistically significant performance and the original signs remain 
the same. Neutral portfolios in the other hand, now appear to underperform on a 5%-
significance level, the t-values being -2,332 and -2,15. The reported ABHARpf value 
for the neutral portfolio is almost identical with table 6 but the standard deviation is 
lower for single bidders. This result is a bit puzzling as it suggests that neutral valuation 
multiple bidders could actually fare better than single bidders. An opposite result is 
observable in the glamour portfolio where the reported underperformance becomes 
much lower but the reported t-values actually become higher than in table 6.  
 
The reported result for P/B portfolios compared to both indexes are very similar to those 
reported in Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Bauman et al. (1998) and Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003). A different result is found by Petmezas (2009) who reports that mean 
differences between high –and low valuation bidders to be insignificant for the three-
year post-merger period. 
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Of course, the reported results could again be affected by measurement problems and 
other biases. Still, like in table 6 the original hypotheses H2 is supported, although all 
reported signs in tables 6 and 7 are negative suggesting that companies undertaking 
M&A underperform, the results clearly support the stated hypotheses H2 i.e. value firms 
outperform glamour firms when their P/B values are used. 
 
 
Table 7. P/B portfolios long-term performance (single bid allowed). 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns for Acquirers 
      
OMXH index 
      
 
N ABHARpf% Std.ABHARpf T-statistics 
Value 29 -3,71 0,733 -0,939 
 
     
Neutral 29 -8,82 0,703 -2,332** 
 
   
  
Glamour 30 -43,01 0,961 -8,172* 
      
OMXH25 index 
      
 
N ABHARpf% Std.ABHARpf T-statistics 
Value 29 -3,47 0,731 -0,881 
 
     
Neutral 29 -8,10 0,700 -2,15** 
 
   
  
Glamour 30 -45,16 0,893 -9,224* 
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
6.1.3. Results from Method of payment 
 
The results from the empirical tests of method of payment and it`s effects to the long-
term post-merger performance are shown in table 8. The observed results show clearly 
that acquirers using only equity or a mixed finance underperform the benchmark 
indexes on a statistically significant 1% level. For the M&A which were completed 
using cash to finance them, the results aren`t nearly as conclusive. Acquisitions 
completed using cash only perform also poorly with negative abnormal returns of -
20,5% and -19,96% compared to the benchmarks. Their reported t-statistics (-1,545 and 
-1,570) are very close to being statistically significant at the 10% -level (a t-value of 
1.645).  
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Table 8. The effect of method of payment to long-term performance. 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns, Method of Payment 
      
OMXH index 
      
 
N ABHARpf% std.ABHARpf T-statistics 
      
Cash 65 -19,96 1,603 -1,545 
 
     
Mixed 15 -16,76 0,448 -9,657* 
 
   
  
Equity 37 -39,98 1,222 -5,381* 
      
OMXH index 
      
 
N ABHARpf% std.ABHARpf T-statistics 
Cash 65 -20,50 1,619 -1,57 
 
     
Mixed 15 -16,66 0,439 -9,801* 
 
   
  
Equity 37 -27,60 1,149 -3,950* 
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
The high number of stocks in the cash portfolio does increase the validity of the 
observed t-value while the results for the mixed portfolio with a low number of stocks 
might remain inconclusive despite its` high t-value. The differences between the 
benchmark indexes are also minimal as only in the equity portfolio happens sizable 
changes. When comparing the reported ABHARpf values for equity portfolio, it is 
significantly smaller when the performance is compared to the OMXH25 index than to 
OMXH index. The difference between reported t-values for equity portfolio differs from 
one another at the 1%-significance level. 
 
The reported results are broadly similar when compared to other international studies. 
For US Loughran and Vijh (1997) report that equity financed mergers underperform 
statistically significantly but mixed or cash financed merger deals don`t. For tender 
offers they report that cash deals underperform. Moeller et al. (2004) on the other hand 
don`t report any statistical abnormal performance for their long-run sample. In the UK 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) report that cash acquirers clearly outperform equity 
bidders. For the post-merger period, cash bidders earn abnormal returns ranging from -
2% to 14% compared to equity bidders -2% to -57%. The results by Petmezas (2009) 
also show that almost all deals (cash, equity or mixed) underperform the following three 
year post-merger period. He also reports that the observed magnitude of the 
underperformance increases from the first post-merger year to the third-post merger 
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year. Overall though, the reported results in table 8 support the H3 as cash bidders 
although having a negative sign, outperform equity bidders. 
 
6.1.4. Results for Size 
 
Table 9 shows the results of acquirer performance when portfolios are constructed using 
market capitalization as a measure of size. The results are very clear, showing that both 
medium and small acquirers clearly underperform at a statistically significant 1%-level. 
And also what is notable is that medium acquirers have an ABHARpf value about twice 
higher than the small firms and over five times higher than large firms. The large 
bidders also have a negative sign suggesting that they fare worse than the benchmark 
indexes, but the negative abnormal returns of -7,62% and -7,32% and the reported t-
values (-1,175 and -1,22) are far from being statistically significant.  
 
 
Table 9. Long-term performance of large, medium and small acquirers. 
Buy and Hold Abnormal returns 
      
Acquirer size OMXH index OMXH25 index 
      
 
N ABHARpf% T-values ABHARpf% T-values 
Large 39 -7,62 -1,175 -7,32 -1,22 
 
     
Medium 39 -42,98 -5,89* -41,24 -5,68* 
 
  
 
 
 
Small 39 -21,71 -3,00* -21,81 -3,01* 
      
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
The results imply that a measurable size effect affected the Finnish M&A at least during 
this observation period, but at the same time the results are somewhat inconsistent with 
other earlier studies. This finding might be caused by the fact that the employed 
benchmark indexes do not sufficiently control for company size. Another plausible 
reason might be that the managers of large companies are more capable than their small 
firm counterparts or that small firm managers might be affected by hubris. (Confirming 
tests for these possibilities are left for future studies). Bauman et al. (1998) show, that 
small firms had the highest overall returns and also the highest standard deviation each 
year. They also report that the reported returns got smaller as the size decile grew. 
Moeller et al. (2004) state that for their full sample they were unable to find any 
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statistical differences between large and small acquirers, but the results show that when 
they acquire private companies large firms outperform small bidders significantly. 
 
In table 10 is shown the calculated t-values for each individual size portfolio which are 
further decomposed to value, neutral and glamour bidders. It must be immediately 
mentioned that the low number of stocks in an individual portfolio (N=13) affects the 
measurements and therefore also the validity of these findings. Still, the results are 
largely what to be expected, as several portfolios display severe underperformance 
regardless of the size or valuation level.  
 
 
Table 10. The long-term effects of size and valuation. 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
      
OMXH index 
 
                          Size 
 
Valuation 
 
Large Medium Small 
 
 
     
ABHARpf(%)  -0,35 -33,30 -17,63  
Glamour 
 (-0,235) (-17,637*) (-10,611*)  
 
 -7,44 -10,27 -1,40  
Neutral 
 
(-7,650*) (-8,318*) (-1,160)  
 
 -0,32 0,58 -2,67  
Value 
 (-0,312) (0,537) (-2,045**)  
      
OMXH25 index 
ABHARpf(%)  0,15 -32,81 -17,49  
Glamour 
 (0,101) (-17,478*) (-10,544*)  
 
 -7,27 -9,14 -1,60  
Neutral 
 
(-7,522*) (-7,400*) (-1,318)  
 
 -0,20 0,70 -2,72  
Value 
 (-0,194) (0,651) (-2,082**)  
      
*,**,*** denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. In this 
table is shown the ABHARpf values for every size/valuation portfolio and also their t-
values in parentheses. 
 
 
It appears again that glamour firms are the primary source of the poor post-merger 
performance, but the magnitude is very different across the size groups. The highest 
observed ABHARpf% difference (-33,88%) is between medium sized value and 
glamour firms, and the smallest between large value and glamour firms only 0,03%. In 
the large portfolio, a majority of it`s poor performance reported in table 9 appears to be 
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caused by neutral valuation companies which perform badly while glamour and value 
bidders do not show any over –or underperformance. 
 
Additional comparison reveals that the tested hypothesis H4 isn`t supported, as on an 
intra portfolio level, value firms do outperform their glamour counterparts in the small 
and medium portfolios, in the large portfolio though the hypothesis is rejected. Large 
value firms are unable to outperform large glamour firms, although as mentioned, the 
number of stocks per portfolio is low and therefore a very poor performance by a single 
bidder could cause the results to be biased. 
 
Even so, a more detailed discussion of some of the results is in order. Firstly, it appers 
that, a size -and a valuation effect does seem to affect the long-term post-merger 
performance, and the effects are observable in almost all individual size/valuation 
groups. Small value firms fare worst when compared to medium –and large value firms. 
The small firms underperform on a statistically significant 5%-level while no under –or 
overperformance is found for medium and large value firms. The opposite is evident 
when comparing neutral portfolios. Regardless of the size of the acquirer, they all have 
a negative sign and the observed t-value for small acquirers is the only one 
unsignificant. Again for glamour acquirers, a complete reversal is notable.  
 
Large glamour companies clearly outperform their medium –and small counterparts 
which both perform poorly. Bauman et al (1998) report, that in their study the largest 
difference between glamour and value companies was in the largest size group while the 
smallest difference was between small value and growth stocks. They also state that 
among medium and large companies value stocks outperform growth stocks. 
 
Secondly, as was reported in several tables before, the choice of the benchmark index 
doesn`t appear to be significant. All results appear to very stable regardless of which 
benchmark is used as only change in the reported sign between benchmark indexes 
happens in the portfolio of large glamour firms and even the magnitude for this change 
remains statistically un-significant. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The present study has studied how pre-merger valuation, size and the chosen method of 
payment affect the long-term performance of the acquiring companies in Finland. A 
time period from 1995 – 2006 was studied and the performance of 117 mergers and 
acquisitions evaluated using an event study method. 
 
The event study results were very convincing and rather stable regardless of which 
benchmark index was used to measure the post-merger performance. The results 
showed that all acquirers underperformed on a 5%-statisticly significant level, but most 
of the underperformance was later shown to be attributable for glamour acquirers which 
fared very poorly. The complete sample had negative abnormal returns of -73,44% and 
–71,76 for multiple bidders and -51,42% and –49,23% for single bidders, and the 
removing of multiple bidders from the sample didn`t have any statistical effect on the 
observed results. The reported abnormal returns though are extremely high compared to 
many other similar studies, as previously have been reported abnormal returns ranging 
from -25% downwards. 
 
As a majority of the sample firms cluster to the turn of the millennium, the large 
difference with previous studies and their reported long-term returns could be partly 
caused by a “peripheria” syndrome. As discussed, the majority of the long-term 
performance studies have been conducted in the US and UK, but Finland as a remote 
financial market is more thinly traded as compared to many other markets and this 
might cause more extreme variation in stock returns. Foreign investors particularly are 
more eager to pull their investments out in an event of economic downturn and therefore 
facilitating excess variation to stock returns.  
 
When further dividing the sample based on individual stocks pre-merger valuation, the 
poor performance of high valuation companies becomes evident. Almost all portfolios, 
discarding the value i.e. low valuation portfolio, had negative abnormal returns and 
underperformed on a one or a five percent significance level. The reported results are 
very similar as what has been found on other international studies. Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998) reported for a US sample that value firms outperformed glamour firms, but I was 
unable to find any significant positive abnormal returns for value firms as reported by 
Rau and Vermaelen. On an international level, broadly similar results were reported by 
Bauman et al. (1998) and in the UK by Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003).   
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When testing the effects of chosen method of payment the results remained very robust. 
Cash –or equity only and the mixed finance portfolio all had negative abnormal returns 
ranging from -39,98% to -16,76%. Acquisitions financed using cash only, didn`t 
underperform on a statistically significant level like the other portfolios thus supporting 
reported findings from other countries. The very poor performance of the equity 
financed deals implies that high valued acquirers were using overvalued stock to 
complete their M&A. 
  
Finally, when evaluating if acquirer size affects the outcome of the M&A, sample 
companies were divided to size portfolios based on their market cap. Again all acquirers 
underperformed but interestingly large firms fared the best. While medium and small 
firms underperformed poorly, the reported negative t-value for large firms was un-
significant. A size effect did indeed appear for this time period but it suggests that large 
firms could be better acquirers than medium and small bidders.  van Dijk (2007) reports 
in his review paper that several studies show that the size effect is time varying and in 
this paper size adjusted benchmarks weren`t used so the confirmation of these results is 
left for future studies. 
 
When each size portfolio was further decomposed based on company pre-merger 
valuation, several interesting results appeared. It must be noted that this lead to very 
small individual portfolios casting a doubt on the reported results and the validity of the 
findings. For the large portfolio, majority of the previously reported underperformance 
was caused by neutral valuation companies which had high negative returns, while 
glamour and value firms fared fairly well. In the case of the large portfolio, hypothesis 
H4 was rejected as no statistical significance was found between value and glamour 
firms. Medium sized value firms outperformed other similar sized companies easily, but 
opposite results were again found for small acquirers. Now, while the glamour firms 
again had very high negative returns neutral firms were able to outperform value firms. 
The results reported in table 10 especially are somewhat susceptible as each portfolio 
had only 13 stocks in them. 
 
Overall, the results clearly imply that acquisitions undertaken by Finnish companies 
where very unsuccessful. While the three-year post-merger period might not be 
sufficient enough to fairly judge the acquisition choices or their eventual success, at a 
first glance they seemed to destroy shareholder value rather than maximize it.  
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Several possibilities for future research have risen during this study. First of all, more 
sophisticated research methods should be used. As reported by Antoniou et al. (2006) 
and Dutta and Jog (2009) the use of the “corrected” t-values suggested by Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) when measuring BHAR returns is highly recommend. Antoniou et al. 
state that several previously reported abnormalities disappeared entirely or the reported 
results became less significant when more precise statistical methods were employed. 
The results found in this study might also be altered or corrected by using the 
“corrected” t-values.  
 
Another path that could be taken is the evaluation of multiple bidders and how they 
fare. While leaving multiple bidders out of the sample didn`t alter the reported results, it 
doesn`t really give an idea how they perform and how much and if they actually over –
or underperform in the long-term. And as has been noted in several studies M&A 
cluster in time and by sector, so a choice to leave them out doesn`t represent the true 
reality of the markets.   
 
Future studies could also try to employ a more complete acquisition sample. As nearly 
two decades have passed since Finnish financial markets became more open and more 
efficient, a more thorough investigation of the completed mergers could be in order, e.g. 
dividing the full sample to sub-samples, concentrating on the turn of the millennium etc. 
While Kallunki et al. (2009) examine the reasons and consequences of foreign bidders’ 
acquisitions of Finnish companies; similar study regarding domestic acquisitions could 
be insightful. These might ver well offer more insights about the M&A markets of 
Finland. Also some additional explanatory factors could be tested, like the relative 
bidder/target size, is the merger diversifying or non-diversifying or does acquiring 
public or private companies produce different announcement period or long-term 
results. 
 
As almost all of the threats described in the M&A outlook (2007) became reality very 
soon after, somewhat ironically even, the M&A markets experienced a rapid halt. The 
worldwide economic disaster caused firms to streamline and cancel or delay their 
ongoing projects. Now, two years later the current low interest rate-level and 
expansionary monetary policies are again offering a boost to faltering economies and 
businesses. In light of the events of last few years, it is therefore interesting to see if the 
probable resurrection of the acquisition markets is approached by bidders and managers 
in a more careful way. Do they continue to make questionable acquisitions or are we 
going to see companies concentrating more on internal growth instead? 
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